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INTRODUCTION
The judiciary... members were left dependant on the legislative, for
their subsistence in office, and some of them for their continuance in it.
If therefore the legislature assumes... judiciary powers, no opposition
is likely to be made; nor, if made, can it be effectual; because in that
case they may put their proceedings into the form of an act of assem-
bly, which will render them obligatory on the other branches. They
have accordingly, in many instances, decided rights which should
have been left to judiciary controversy .... And this is done with no
ill intention. The views of the present members are perfectly upright.
When they are led out of their regular province, it is by art in others,
and inadvertence in themselves. And this will probably be the case for
some time to come.
Thomas Jefferson
Notes on the State of Virginia
The doctrine of the separation of powers is a well-known
and fundamental principle in American government. 2 It is
implied in the federal constitution and explicitly provided for
in the constitutions of most states.3 But in the development of
the doctrine during the past two hundred years, there has
rarely been any calm in the recurrent storm of debate over how
1. T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, Query XIII, at 120-21 (W.
Peden ed. 1954) (1787).
2. According to the doctrine of separated powers, tyranny is best prevented if
the ability to make, execute and administer the laws is divided between three
branches of government: legislative, executive and judicial. This separation is
designed to prevent the excessive accumulation of power by one person or group.
The related concept of checks and balances creates a limited interdependence
between the branches; each is allowed a certain amount of restraint or control over
the actions of the other two, thereby preventing the usurpation of power and creating
the need for compromise.
3. There are at least thirty-four states that have explicit provisions in their
constitutions calling for separated powers. See Browde & Occhialino, Separation of
Powers and the Judicial Rule-Making Power in New Mexico: The Need for Prudential
Constraints, 15 N.M.L. REV. 407, 474-77 (1985) (appendix contains a list of the states
and their constitutional provisions).
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this fundamental principle should operate. Article III of the
Minnesota Constitution states:
The powers of government shall be divided into three dis-
tinct departments: legislative, executive and judicial. No
person or persons belonging to or constituting one of these
departments shall exercise any of the powers properly be-
longing to either of the others except in the instances ex-
pressly provided in this constitution. 4
This simple statement of the doctrine, however, is little help in
determining which powers properly belong to each of the de-
partments of government and the determination is made more
difficult when the powers to be exercised are not mentioned in
the document.
One of the powers of government not mentioned in the state
constitution has recently been cause for considerable confu-
sion and debate: it is not settled in Minnesota whether court
procedural rulemaking is a power of the judicial or legislative
branch, or some combination of the two. The power of proce-
dural rulemaking is the ability to decide and control the proce-
dural rules or laws under which the courts will operate.
5
Procedural rules are those which govern the methods of plead-
ing, process and evidence in court. Creating and controlling
these procedural rules is a substantial power: they govern a
wide range of subjects. Rules of the Minnesota Supreme
Court govern civil procedure, appellate procedure, criminal
procedure, evidence, juvenile procedure and family court
procedure. 6
When the Minnesota Constitution was written in 1857, the
power to determine court procedure was explicitly vested in
the legislative branch: "Legal pleadings and proceedings in the
courts of this state shall be under the direction of the legisla-
ture. ' 7 But one hundred years later that section was removed
during the process of amending the judiciary article and the
4. MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1.
5. Rulemaking without the "procedural" modifier can also be defined to include
the power over judicial administration and legal practice. Court administrative rules
are those concerning the court's internal administrative matters and practice rules
are those governing the conduct and practice of attorneys and judges. These sub-
jects are beyond the scope of this article.
6. Seegenerally MINNESOTA RULES OF COURT (1988) (West Publishing Company's
annual "Desk Copy"). As this article goes to print, uniform probate procedures are
also in the process of being adopted by the court.
7. MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 14 (1857, repealed 1957).
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constitution of Minnesota is now silent on which branch of
government should control procedural rulemaking.
In Minnesota, both the legislature and the supreme court-
by statute and court rule-provide procedures that are to be
followed in court proceedings. Each branch of government
also presumes that its rule will prevail when both branches
pass differing rules on the same subject. In other words, both
the legislature and judiciary claim to have the ultimate power
over the procedural rules of court. This controversy over the
rulemaking power has led to conflict and tension between the
judiciary and legislature; it has also resulted in confusion and
debate among legislators and members of the bar over the sep-
aration of powers and proper methods of rulemaking. In addi-
tion, some people have taken advantage of the two processes
so that changes are made in their favor: when the rules of one
branch of government are not to their liking, they turn to the
other branch for relief.
Which branch of government is the source of power over
court procedures in Minnesota-the legislature, judiciary, or
both? If the two branches of government pass conflicting rules
on the same subject, which should prevail? Are there any prin-
ciples that can be gleaned from Minnesota's history of
rulemaking or from the state's "silent" constitution? There
are also differences between the branches in their methods and
abilities to establish rules: Is one branch better equipped to
decide the rules of court? In response to these questions and
others, we shall argue in this article that-for constitutional
and policy reasons-rulemaking is an inherent power of the
courts in Minnesota. The legislature should not function as a
separate and conflicting procedure-making body. If, however,
the legislature passes statutes in those areas not already gov-
erned by a promulgated rule, the court, as a matter of comity,
may let them stand.
This article will approach the topic of Minnesota's proce-
dural rulemaking in five sections. The first surveys the history.
of the rulemaking power from pre-territorial times to the pres-
ent day. Particular emphasis is given to the proposals and
changes that have been made from time to time and to the
state constitution. From this history, we can see some of the
failures and successes of the procedural rule process over the
years. We can also derive an explanation for why Minnesota's
present constitution is silent on rulemaking. The second sec-
[Vol. 15
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tion explains the doctrine of inherent judicial power, as it re-
lates to rulemaking in Minnesota, and provides a legal basis for
our position as explained above. The third section describes
the present process of rulemaking by the court. The fourth
section recommends suggestions for improving the court's
rulemaking process. And finally, the fifth section of this article
describes a recent controversy surrounding the rule governing
the order of final arguments in a criminal trial. The problems
described in this case illustrate many of the disadvantages in
determining court procedure by the legislature. This case also
illustrates Jefferson's admonition: the legislative branch is
often led out of their regular province by "art in others, and
inadvertence in themselves."
I. A HISTORY OF THE POWER OVER COURT
PROCEDURE IN MINNESOTA
The history of the power to provide for court procedures in
Minnesota follows a pendulum-like pattern similar to that of
many other states and the federal government.8 Over the past
150 years, the power has been exercised by both the legislative
and judicial branches, but each have had varying degrees of
control. In Minnesota's pre-territorial days, the few courts in
operation used the common law and chancery system inherited
from England. Under this system, rules were mainly con-
trolled by the courts through judicial decisions. When Minne-
sota became a territory in the mid-nineteenth century, the
power shifted to nearly complete legislative control with the
arrival of the Field Code and the popular power of legislative
government. The control of court procedure by statute con-
tinued in Minnesota for nearly one hundred years, until a na-
tionwide movement began to restore the rulemaking power in
the judicial branch. The progress of this movement in Minne-
sota is nearly complete: the legislature is still involved to a de-
8. There are a few accounts of the history of rulemaking in other states. See, e.g.,
Browde & Occhialino, supra note 3 and Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of
Powers in Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. REV. 1, 5-27 (1975). The most interesting history of
state rulemaking is in New Jersey. In 1949, the state supreme court, under the lead-
ership of Chief Justice Arthur Vanderbilt, declared rulemaking to be an exclusive
power of the judicial branch and not to be interfered with by the legislature. See
Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1949). For varying criticisms and
defenses of the lWinbeny decision, see Kaplan & Greene, Tile Legislatures Relation to
Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of i1inberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REV. 234 (1951)
and Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28 (1952).
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gree, but judicially promulgated and controlled rules widely
govern court procedure, evidence, and practice.
A. Early Minnesota and the Arrival of the Field Code
In 1838, two justices of the peace were commissioned to
serve the area on the outskirts of the Wisconsin and Iowa terri-
tories;9 thus began the first form of ajudicial system in the land
that is now Minnesota.' 0 These two justices of the peace re-
mained the only form of a judiciary in Minnesota for almost
ten years and their power was vast and nearly unaccountable."
The legal practice that began in the pre-territorial courts of the
1830s followed the form of the common law and chancery sys-
tem and made distinctions between actions at law and suits in
equity.' 2 This was a system that originated in England during
9. Before the Minnesota Territory was created, its land fell within the extended
boundaries of the Wisconsin and Iowa territories. The western border of the Wis-
consin Territory, the fifth to be created under the Northwest Ordinance, reached to
the Mississippi River. The Iowa Territory, under the Louisiana Purchase, occupied
the land that lie west of the river. There are many sources that describe this early
pre-territorial history and the land divisions of Minnesota. See, e.g., W. ANDERSON &
A. LOBB, A HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF MINNESOTA 4-28 (1921); T. BLEGEN,
MINNESOTA: A HISTORY OF THE STATE 159-81 (1963); 1 W. FOLWELL, A HISTORY OF
MINNESOTA 231-65 (rev. ed. 1956); and Haycraft, Territorial Existence and Constitutional
Statehood of Minnesota (1946), reprinted in 1 MINN. STAT. ANN. 145.
10. According to an article on the legal affairs of Minnesota's frontier days,
"[t]he law came to Minnesota literally embodied in two men: Henry Hastings Sibley,
and Joseph R. Brown." Sheran & Baland, The Law, Courts, and Lawyers in the Frontier
Days of Minnesota: An Informal Legal History of the Years 1835 to 1865, 2 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1, 6 (1976).
11. According to Sheran and Baland,
The magistrates power in those early days was at least as vast as the territory
of his jurisdiction. Sibley remarked how he had matters pretty much under
his own control, "there being little chance of an appeal" from his decisions.
Brown became literally a one-man government for St. Croix County in 1838
when he was elected county clerk, county commissioner, and clerk of district
court. For all their authority and power, both Brown and Sibley seemed to
have exercised it in exemplary fashion. No tales have come down of either
unjustly abusing his discretion, and both men retained the esteem of their
peers.
Id. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted). Sibley once remarked, "[S]ome of the simple-minded
people around me firmly believed that I had the power of life and death." Id. at 7
n.45 (quoting, SIBLEY, Reminiscences of the Early Days of Minnesota, in 3 COLLECTIONS OF
THE MINNESOTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY 242, 265-66 (1880)).
12. See 1 B. SHIPMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE DISTRICT AND SUPREME COURTS
OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA § 1 (1902). See also 1 M. PIRSIG, PIRSIG ON MINNESOTA
PLEADING 10 (5th ed. 1987). See generally B. SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING (1923).
For a concise description of common-law procedure and the different forms of
action, and for a description of equity procedures, see PIRSIG, supra, at 5-7, and I D.
MCFARLAND & W. KEPPEL, MINNESOTA CIVIL PRACTICE §§ 101-104 (1979).
[Vol. 15
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the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and was subsequently
adopted throughout the United States during colonization.'
3
Minnesota adopted this system of procedure from the Terri-
tory of Wisconsin with relatively few changes.14 The power of
providing court procedures in the common law and chancery
systems of these early Minnesota courts was assumed primarily
by the judges.
15
After the territories of Iowa and Wisconsin were admitted
into the Union in 1846 and 1848, respectively, the people oc-
cupying the land adjacent to those boundaries were left with-
out a form of government. Congress, responding to their
request for recognition, passed the Organic Act organizing the
Territory of Minnesota in 1849.16 The judicial power was or-
ganized into a supreme court, three district courts, probate
courts and justices of the peace. t 7 The Organic Act also pro-
vided that the laws in force in Wisconsin at the time of its ad-
mission to the Union would be valid and operate in the
Minnesota Territory until altered, modified or repealed by the
governor and legislative assembly. 18 Therefore, the same sys-
13. MCFARLAND & KEPPEL, supra note 12, at §§ 101-104. For an account of how
the rulemaking power developed in early England and the United States, see Tyler,
The Origin of the Rule-Making Power and Its Exercise by Legislatures, 22 A.B.A. J. 772
(1936). See also J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 21-61
(1977).
14. Wisconsin had a major influence on the legal system of early Minnesota:
From 1836 until 1848, when Wisconsin became a state, Minnesota had been
a part of Wisconsin territory. The practice of that period was that of the
common law and chancery systems, as derived from England, modified in
some respects by statutes and rules of courts. Wisconsin became a state in
1848, and in 1849 Minnesota was declared a separate territory. The com-
mon law practice continued, with the addition of such statutes and rules as
were needed for better adaptation to the local conditions.
Schochet, Minnesota's First State Supreme Court (1858-18.65), and the Introduction of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 11 MINN. L. REV. 93, 114 (1927).
15. "The rules of pleading at common law were developed primarily by judicial
decision as pleading points were raised by the parties, and secondarily, by rules of
court and by statute." MCFARLAND & KEPPEL, supra note 12, at § 112. See also PIRsIG,
supra note 12, at § 6.
16. See ANDERSON & LOBB, supra note 9, at 23. The Organic Act was the basic
charter for the government of the territory until Minnesota became a state nine years
later. The government formed by that act called for a governor, a secretary, a legisla-
tive assembly, a delegate to Congress, and a judicial branch to be established. For a
discussion of the political maneuvering necessary for achieving territorial status, see
id. at 29-35 and 1 W. FOLWELL., supra note 9, at 231-65.
17. The supreme court consisted of a chief justice and two associate justices,
each of whom also presided over one of the district courts. Minn. Organic Act, § 9,
reprinted in 1 MINN. STAT. at xxxix (1986).
18. Minn. Organic Act, § 12. Professor Anderson's explanation for the decision
19891
7
Pirsig and Tietjen: Court Procedure and the Separation of Powers in Minnesota
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
tem of pleading and procedure that governed courts before
Minnesota became a territory-common-law procedure-was
still in effect. 19
Early in its first term, the new territorial supreme court of
Minnesota promulgated its own rules of practice. 20 It is uncer-
tain though how authority for making such rules came about;
there was no mention in the Organic Act of which branch of
government should govern the rules of court. It is likely that
the court believed it was their inherent power and a necessity
that they promulgate rules. The lawyers and judges in the new
territory came from various legal backgrounds and exper-
iences. This was cause for a great deal of confusion over the
proper rules of practice. The court's promulgated rules were
probably just an attempt at uniformity by the justices. 21 It is
also possible that the court found support for their decision to
promulgate rules in a 1836 statute passed by the legislative as-
sembly of the Wisconsin Territory. This law, directing the
Wisconsin territorial supreme court to promulgate rules for
that Wisconsin's laws would remain in effect instead of Iowa's was that most of the
inhabitants of the Minnesota territory resided east of the Mississippi at the time of
the Organic Act. Because Wisconsin's laws had governed them before the creation of
the Territory of Minnesota, it was only natural that they continue in effect. ANDER-
SON & LOBB, supra note 9, at 35.
19. See Schochet, supra note 14, at 114.
20. See RULES OF PRACTICE FOR THE SUPREME, DISTRICT, AND CHANCERY COURTS
OF THE TERRITORY OF MINNESOTA (1850). See also R. GUNDERSON, A HISTORY OF THE
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, § II, at 7 (1937).
21. In Gunderson's history of the Minnesota Supreme Court he described the
situation as follows:
In the meantime changes were taking place in the courts of Minnesota.
[Procedural rules] were quickly dropped, others survived, and it largely be-
came a matter of trial and error. In this connection it must be understood
that the judges and lawyers in the territory had been drawn from almost
every state in the Union, and each had brought with him certain ideas and
practices favored in his native state, and ones which he himself had come to
consider as being the most approved. Consequently, no two courts in the
territory were conducted in exactly the same manner, and likewise no two
attorneys conducted litigation along parallel lines.
Id. at § IV, at 7-8. J. Fletcher Williams, in his A HISTORY OF THE CITY OF SAINT PAUL
TO 1875, explains further:
[ChiefJustice] Goodhue says: "The roll of attorneys is large for a new coun-
try. About 20, of the lankest and hungriest description, were in attend-
ance." The term lasted six days. "The proceedings," says the Chronicle and
Register, "were for the first two or three days somewhat crude, owing to the
assembling of a bar composed of persons from nearly every State. But, by
the urbanity, conciliatory firmness, and harmonious course taken by the
Court, matters were in a great measure systematized."
J. F. WILLIAMS, THE HISTORY OF THE CITY OF SAINT PAUL TO 1875 at 234 (1876).
[Vol. 15
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both the supreme court and the district courts, was in force in
Minnesota by virtue of the Organic Act.
2 2
Judicially promulgated rules did not remain the only form of
written rules in the new territory for long, however, nor did the
influence of Wisconsin's laws and the common law methods of
procedure survive. A system of "code pleading" was sweeping
the states. 23 The code system of procedure radically altered
the methods of pleading and procedure, while, at the same
time, essentially shifted the power to prescribe court proce-
dures to the legislative branch. The first state to pass such laws
regulating procedure in the courts was New York in 1848.
Known as the Field Code-so named after its main proponent
David Dudley Field-this new method of procedure was in-
tended to simplify and accelerate court proceedings. 24 Law-
rence M. Friedman, describing the Code, said:
Stylistically, no greater affront to the common-law tradition
can be imagined than the 1848 code. It was couched in
brief, gnomic, Napoleonic sections, tightly worded and skel-
etal; there was no trace of the elaborate redundancy, the vo-
luptuous heaping on of synonyms, so characteristic of
Anglo-American statutes .... Taken literally, this was the
death sentence of common-law pleading.
25
The Field Code was indeed a revolutionary development: it
22. 1836 Wis. Laws 35 (codified in MINN. REV. STAT. ch. 69, § 6 (1852) (repealed
1866)). This statute reached Minnesota by way of a "domino" effect. Minnesota was
once a part of two great land divisions in the United States: the Northwest Territory
and the Louisiana Territory. The boundary line that divided the two land areas was
the Mississippi River: the Northwest Territory extended east of the river and the Lou-
isiana Territory to the west. From each land mass, Congress carved new territories
and states. The first territory and state to be carved from the Northwest Territory
was Ohio in 1802, followed by Indiana in 1807, Illinois in 1818, Michigan in 1837,
Wisconsin in 1848 and Minnesota in 1849. In 1820, the territorial legislature of
Michigan enacted a statute granting their supreme court full power to prescribe rules
of procedure and practice. When the Wisconsin Territory was carved from the Mich-
igan Territory in 1836, this same statute remained in effect through the organic act of
Congress that established Wisconsin. (Essentially, this was the same judicial
rulemaking principle that was applied to the organization of the Minnesota Terri-
tory.) Michigan eventually adopted this statute in their constitution of 1850. See infra
note 149. In Wisconsin and Minnesota, it remained only a statute.
These events are described in an article by Edmund M. Morgan in 1918. See
Morgan,Judicial Regulation of Court Procedure, 2 MINN. L. REV. 81, 94-95 (1918). Mor-
gan's purpose for writing was to encourage re-vesting the rulemaking power in the
judicial branch.
23. See FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 391-411 (2d ed. 1985).
24. See id. at 392-93; Schochet, supra note 14, at 113.
25. FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 391-92.
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abolished the distinction between actions at law and suits in
equity; it abolished the forms of actions such as trespass, tres-
pass on the case and replevin, and substituted a single action
for all civil proceedings; and it abolished the complicated com-
mon-law pleading and fictions, reducing pleading to a simple
statement of facts by the parties of their cause of action and
defense. 26
The Field Code, which was only an element of a much larger
nationwide movement intent on codifying all of the common
law, quickly became popular in other states. 27 In 1851, the
Minnesota Territorial Legislature took the first step in adopt-
ing its version of the Code. The common-law system of forms
of actions was abolished and united into one form of action
known as a "civil suit." 28 Suits at chancery and equity re-
mained distinguished from actions at law in the 1851 Code,
but in 1853, this distinction was also abolished and thereafter
all suits were conducted as civil actions. 29 "After this enact-
ment, the two civil codes, those of Minnesota and New York,
were fundamentally the same."30
In addition to improvements over common-law procedure,
the legislature's adoption of the Code represented a shift in
power over court procedures. The legislature was now very
much in control, though some early common-law rules of
26. See PIRSIG, supra note 12, at 17-19; Schochet, supra note 14, at 114. See also
MCFARLAND & KEPPEL, supra note 12, at § 121-122.
27. See PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY 385-428 (1980) and
FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 403-11.
Nearly all of the mid-western states, including Minnesota, had adopted some
version of the Field Code before the outbreak of the Civil War. Though originating
in New York, the Field Code was much more popular in the west. This has been
attributed to the spirit and open-mindedness of the young lawyers and judges of the
western states; they were supposedly less adverse to change and more eclectic than
the established eastern shore. Id. at 394-95.
28. See MINN. REV. STAT. ch. 70 (1851). The statute explained:
The distinction between the forms of actions at law, heretofore existing, are
abolished; and there shall be in this territory hereafter, but one form of ac-
tion at law, to be called a civil action, for the enforcement or protection of
private rights, and the redress of private wrongs; except as otherwise ex-
pressly provided by statute.
Id. at ch. 70, § 1.
29. See MINN. REV. STAT., ch. 69 (1853). See also 1 W. FOLWELL, supra note 9, at
263-64.
30. Schochet, supra note 14, at 122. Schochet's article contains a thorough de-
scription of court procedure during this period and the events surrounding the adop-
tion of the Field Code in Minnesota, including subsequent revisions and additions.
See id. at 112-25.
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pleading continued to be recognized for the sake of conven-
ience and necessity.3 ' The legislature also provided that the
supreme court would have the power to "provide general rules
for its own conduct," but expressly stated that "no legal rule
or statutory provision [was] to be violated or abrogated
thereby."32 The judiciary's rulemaking role was reduced dur-
ing this period of the procedural code to promulgating rules
concerning mainly internal procedures and court administra-
tive matters. 33
When Minnesota became a state in 1858, the civil code was
still in effect. The new constitution provided that all the laws
of the territory would continue unless they were repugnant to
the constitution.3 4 Minnesota's new system of court procedure
by statute, however, was not universally popular. For example,
during the 1859-60 session of the legislature an attempt was
made to revert back to the common law system of procedure,
but the bill was "[t]abled, postponed several times . . .finally
tabled again, and heard of no more."3 5
The shift of power from the courts to the legislature was re-
inforced in 1857 when the constitution of Minnesota was
drafted. The legislative branch was expressly given power
over court procedures in a provision of the constitution that
remained in the document for the next one hundred years.
Section fourteen of the judiciary article read in part: "Legal
pleadings and proceedings in the Courts of this State shall be
31. "In some instances the objectionable features, as well as those that were de-
sirable, were taken from the former system. The conservatism of the bench stimu-
lated the tendency to look to the former rules and principles. MCFARLAND &
KEPPEL, supra note 12, at § 122.
32. MINN. COLL. TERR. STAT., ch. 9, § 11 (1853).
33. In 1905, for instance, the Minnesota Legislature enacted the following
statute:
[The supreme court] shall have all the authority necessary for carrying into
execution its judgments and determinations, and for the exercise of its juris-
diction as the supreme judicial tribunal of the state, agreeable to the usages
and principles of law; also to prescribe, and from time to time amend and
modify, rules of practice therein, not inconsistent with the law, and to pro-
vide for the publication thereof at the cost of the state.
MINN. REV. STAT., ch. 5, § 73 (1905). The Minnesota Supreme Court periodically
published such rules. See, e.g., MINNESOTA COURT RULES (1926) (rules concerning
such matters as court clerk duties and filing procedures for the supreme court and
district courts).
34. MINN. CONST., Schedule § 2 (1857).
35. Schochet, supra note 14, at 118.
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under the direction of the Legislature." 36
The framers' inclusion of this explicit provision is not sur-
prising when considered in light of the political sentiments of
the mid-nineteenth century. During the period when Minne-
sota's constitution was written, there was an unyielding faith in
the omniscience of the elected representative and a lasting sus-
picion of judicial officials and their "unchecked" powers.37
This is evident from the debates at Minnesota's first constitu-
tional convention.38 There is no evidence, however, of any dis-
cussion by members of the convention regarding article six,
section fourteen. It is likely that some of the drafters of the
constitution considered court procedure to be a fundamental
power of the judicial branch. Therefore, this express provision
was necessary so that there would not be a violation of the ex-
press separation of powers and no question of the legislature's
ability to enact codes of procedure.3 9 This legislative control
over court procedure continued in Minnesota-and in other
states adopting the Field Code-for at least three quarters of a
century, before the power reverted back to the courts.
36. MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 14 (1857, repealed 1957).
37. Roscoe Pound explained:
Along with the rigid analytical separation of powers there went for a time an
idea of omnicompetence of the legislature.... It is an echo of an idea that
goes back to the beginnings of our polity. Despite our constitutional theory
of coordinate and coequal departments of government, the legislative de-
partment claimed the hegemony and in large part maintained it down to the
Civil War. As representatives of the sovereign people, legislators assumed
that all the powers of the people were devolved upon them.
Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28, 34-35 (1952).
Consider also the statement of Anderson and Lobb describing the distrust of the
executive branch:
Just as the English royal colonies in America before the Revolution, having
suffered from the excesses of powerful, appointed governors, reacted
against a continuance of "one man rule" when they drew up their first state
constitutions, even so did some of the new states in the west whose experi-
ence under powerful territorial governors had been none too happy, create
for themselves executives much weakened as compared to the territorial
governors.
ANDERSON & LOBB, supra note 9, at 33.
38. For example, when the Democrats took up debate on the judiciary article of
their proposed constitution, the convention members discussed at length the ques-
tion of whether to require supreme court justices to face elections. See THE DEBATES
AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 493-517 (Good-
rich pr. 1857). See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 371-84 (discussing the trend
throughout the country of electing judges).
39. See also infra note 63.
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B. Procedural Reform and the Judicial Rulemaking Movement
In the early twentieth century, control over court procedure
by the legislative branch and particularly the Field Code model
of procedure were increasingly coming under attack. 40 This
assault on legislative control over procedure-led primarily by
members of the academia and the American Bar Association-
was due to a discontent in the legal profession over the legisla-
ture's disinterestedness and lack of competence in procedural
reform and the resulting general inefficiency of court proce-
dure. It was also felt that a lawyerly balance needed to be
struck between the fictionalized pleadings of the common-law
courts and the Code's simplistic and layman-like pleadings and
presentation of the issues.41
The nationwide movement for court procedural reform
achieved its first success at the federal level. In 1934, Con-
gress passed an enabling act granting authority to the United
States Supreme Court to determine the rules of civil procedure
for the federal courts. When state courts have undertaken to
adopt rules of procedure they have followed the example set
on the federal level. For instance, the Minnesota Legislature
passed a similar act in 1947. This section will review this
movement for procedural reform and the rise of the judicial
rulemaking power at the federal level and in Minnesota.
1. The Federal Enabling Act of 1934
In 1873, as part of the general overhaul of the English judi-
cial system, Parliament included a provision that the newly cre-
ated Supreme Court would have the power to promulgate
rules of procedure. Little notice of this was taken in the United
States prior to the beginning of the twentieth century. In
1906, Dean Roscoe Pound gave his famous address in St. Paul,
Minnesota entitled, "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice," in which brief mention of
the subject was made.42
40. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 393-403.
41. See PIRSIG, supra note 12, at 6-7.
42. "A modern practice act lays down the general principles of practice and
leaves details to rules of court." 29 A.B.A. R, rs. 395, 413 (1906). Dean Pound later
changed his views on the role of the legislature. For a discussion of Pound's
rulemaking approach, see Browde & Occhialino, supra note 3, at 421-25. Pound also
wrote several articles regarding rulemaking: Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Re-
form, 4 ILL. L. REV. 388 (1910); Pound, Regulation ofJudicial Procedure by Rules of Court,
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Shortly thereafter, the American Bar Association took up the
subject. It evidently concluded that the broader procedural re-
forms suggested by the Pound address could only be achieved
through court rules and not by legislation. It decided also that
it would focus on obtaining such authority for the United
States Supreme Court in civil actions. It created the Commit-
tee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, headed by Mr. Thomas W.
Shelton, to promote the necessary legislation.
Mr. Shelton devoted his energies for the next twenty years to
attempting to get favorable congressional action on the bills he
perennially sponsored that would give the Court rulemaking
power. All of his efforts failed. His principal opponent was
Senator Thomas J. Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, who once remarked, "Such reverses neither dis-
courage nor deter the principal proponent of the measure. It
defies death.
' 43
Senator Walsh's principal arguments were that under the
Conformity Act of 1872, under which procedure in civil cases
was to conform, "as near as may be," to the procedure of the
state in which the federal trial took place, lawyers needed to
know but one procedure, that of the state. If the United States
Supreme Court should issue new rules for federal courts it
would result in lawyers having to get acquainted with two dis-
tinct systems of procedure. He argued further that the
Supreme Court was in no position to take on the added burden
that would be entailed if it had to prepare a system of proce-
dural rules.
The proponents replied that under the Conformity Act there
were so many exceptions to following state procedures that
there was in fact no common system between the state and fed-
eral courts. They urged further that a legislative body was not
competent to deal with problems of court procedure, that stat-
utory provisions were rigid and difficult to change and that
courts were more competent to understand the problems of
procedure and by rules provide the necessary remedies. They
10 ILL. L. REV. 163 (1915); Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J.
599 (1926); Pound, Regulating Procedural Details by Rules of Court, 13 A.B.A. J. 12
(1927); and Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28
(1952).
43. Address before the Tri-State Bar Association, 1926, reproduced in 55 A.B.A.
Rvrs. 525. See also Walsh, Rule-Making Power on the Law Side of Federal Practice, 6 OR. L.
REV. 1 (1926).
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contended further that the simplified rules adopted by the
court would be adopted also by the several states and hence
provide a common procedure for both federal and state
courts .44
In 1930, efforts to secure the rulemaking authority came to
an end with Mr. Shelton's death. His successors, not equally
dedicated, recommended to the association that the attempt to
secure the rulemaking authority for the court be discontinued.
The recommendation was adopted. It has generally been as-
sumed that the failure to secure the desired legislation was at-
tributable to Senator Walsh. It seems fair to say that while he
was the leader of the opposition he could not have succeeded
without the support of his congressional colleagues.
The 1932 election brought in a new administration and a
new Congress, and with them, a new climate of change and
reform that was not directed only to the then distressed econ-
omy. In a 1934 address to the American Bar Association the
new attorney general announced that, with the approval of the
President, he was asking Congress to enact legislation giving
rulemaking power to the United States Supreme Court along
the lines that the Association had so long advocated. 45 The
proposed Act was enacted June 19, 1934.46 On June 3, 1935,
the Supreme Court appointed a fourteen member advisory
committee to make recommendations to the Court on rules of
civil procedure. William D. Mitchell, a name familiar to Min-
nesotans, was appointed its chairman and Dean Charles E.
Clark of Yale University Law School its reporter.47
44. The literature advocating these views was extensive. There were numerous
articles in the legal journals during the twenties and thirties debating the merits of
whether to vest the judicial branch with more rulemaking power or to maintain the
legislature's control. See, e.g., The Rule-Making Power: A Bibliography, 16 A.B.A.J. 199,
200 (1930); Symposium, 6 OR. L. REV. 1 (1926); and Symposium, 13 A.B.A.J. 1 (Supp.
1927). For a historical account of the dispute, see Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil
Procedure-L The Background, 44 YALE L. JOUR. 387 (1935); Sunderland, The Grant of
Rule-Making Power to the Supreme Court of the United States, 32 MIcH. L. REV. 1116
(1934). For an earlier Minnesota article that argued for restoring the rulemaking
power in the judicial branch, see Morgan, supra note 22, at 81.
45. See Cummings, Immediate Problems for the Bar, 20 A.B.A. J. 212, 213 (1934).
The Attorney General notes that three prior presidents, Taft, Wilson and Coolidge
had also approved this legislation.
46. 48 Stat. 1064, ch. 651.
47. Professor Wilbur H. Cherry of the University of Minnesota Law School and
Professor Edmund Morgan, then formerly of the University of Minnesota Law
School, were also members of the advisory committee. The author Pirsig succeeded
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In 1935, the Committee submitted its first draft of the rules
to the profession for comment, suggestions and criticism. As
Dean Clark observed:
Now we come to one of the most interesting and important
of the various steps in cooperative effort at law reform-for
the entire bar and bench of the country in effect is invited to
scrutinize and to criticize the preliminary draft of the rules
which the Committee has prepared. 48
On December 20, 1937, the final revised draft was submitted
to the Court which laid the rules before Congress. The rules
became effective because Congress failed to take action within
the time specified by the Act.
The question occurs, why was enabling legislation deemed
necessary? The procedure by which litigation is presented is
vital to a court's proper performance of its duties. Control
over that procedure is necessary if the court is to perform its
judicial functions with maximum efficiency and effectiveness.
For similar reasons, courts have uniformly held that the consti-
tution grants them inherent control over the legal profes-
sion. 49 The legislature consists primarily of laymen not
familiar with court procedures or the problems they present.
The Field Code of Civil Procedure was a clear example of rigid
statutory provisions which invited litigation over the meaning
of its terms and constant attempts at statutory changes.
Why did the original proponents of court rulemaking power
not invoke the inherent power of the courts to control their
own procedures rather than vainly seek legislative authoriza-
tion? The reasons may be found in an article written by Dean
Pound. 50 He made a persuasive case for the position that when
the United States Constitution established the United States
Supreme Court, it was intended that the Court should have
those powers then exercised by similar courts in England. At
that time, the King's Bench Court had full rulemaking power
not only for proceedings before it but also for lower courts as
well. Hence, Dean Pound maintained, the United States
Supreme Court equally has these powers without the necessity
of legislative action.
Professor Cherry on the committee. A complete list of the membership of the origi-
nal advisory committee is listed in 21 A.B.A.J. 398 (1935).
48. Clark, The Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A.J. 447 (1936).
49. See infra note 167.
50. Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926).
[Vol. 15
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss1/13
COURT PROCEDURE
Nevertheless, Dean Pound recognized the realities of the sit-
uation then existing. Beginning in the early and middle part of
the nineteenth century, and subsequently when Dean Pound
wrote, court procedure was governed almost entirely by stat-
ute. The Field Code of Civil Procedure, adopted in over
twenty states, was an example. 5' To hold that the power to
provide for court procedure constitutionally resided exclu-
sively in the courts to the exclusion of the legislature would
have invalidated this extensive legislation. No court rules be-
ing in existence, this would have left a major procedural vac-
uum throughout the country. Hence, Dean Pound wrote:
It is a misfortune that American courts ever gave up their
control of procedure. It may be that today, after seventy-
five years of codes and practice acts and prolific procedural
legislation, we can't go so far as to pronounce such legisla-
tive interference with the operations of a coordinate depart-
ment to be unconstitutional. Perhaps the ground is so far
debatable that the courts could not have resisted legislative
annexation of that domain. Today, possibly, we must con-
cede that the legislature may enact codes of procedure and
detailed practice acts. Equally, however, we should insist
that the legislature ought not to do such things, not merely
on grounds of expediency and for the sake of a better and
more effective administration of justice, but as a matter of
due regard for the constitutional system of separation of
powers. 52
Recognizing the prospect of otherwise creating a chaotic situa-
tion, the advocates of rulemaking authority accepted the as-
sumption that statutory provisions on court procedures were
valid and that, as incident thereto, it was necessary to obtain
legislative approval before courts could exercise their rulemak-
ing function. Many states thereafter followed the example and
enacted enabling legislation without considering the condi-
tions which originally made it necessary.
2. The Minnesota Enabling Act of 1947
In response to the federal movement for court and proce-
dural reform, the members of the Minnesota State Bar Associa-
tion appointed a committee at their annual convention in 1936
for the purpose of considering two propositions:
51. See supra note 27.
52. Pound, supra note 50, at 601.
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(1) The feasibility and advisability of conferring general
rule-making power in matters of practice and procedure in
the district courts of this state upon the supreme court of
this state under appropriate enactments.
(2) The feasibility and advisability of conforming the
Minnesota system of practice and procedure in the district
courts to the system eventually to be prescribed by the
Supreme Court of the United States to the federal district
court, to the end that the evident advantages of such uni-
formity may be secured. .... 53
The group appointed for this purpose was called the "Com-
mittee on Rule-Making Power of Courts-Conformity of Min-
nesota and Federal Practice." Its membership included
Professor Wilbur H. Cherry, an original member of the federal
advisory committee on rules of civil procedure.
In 1937, following a long and insistent effort by the bench
and bar of Minnesota, the legislature created a Judicial Council
for the purpose of the "continuous study of the organization,
rules and methods of procedure and practice of the judicial
system of the state, and of all matters relating to the adminis-
tration of said system and its several departments." 54 This
Council was composed primarily of prominent members from
Minnesota's legal establishment. In early 1938, the Council
appointed a committee for the purpose of conducting a study
of the proposed federal rules of civil procedure and "ascertain-
ing which of them might be recommended for adoption in this
state." 55 This committee of the Judicial Council worked in co-
operation on this project with the bar association's Committee
on Rule-Making Power of Courts.
56
Throughout the remaining year, these two committees held
joint meetings each week, during which the new federal rules
were examined and debated. In December of 1938, the final
report of the committees and their draft of the rules as pro-
posed for Minnesota were submitted to the Judicial Council.
Several thousand copies of the proposed rules were then
mailed by the Council to every lawyer and judge in Minnesota
53. Proceedings of the Minnesota State Bar Association,July 10, 1936, reprinted in
21 MINN. L. REV. at 124 (Supp. 1936).
54. 1937 Minn. Laws ch. 467, sec. 1.
55. THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, FIRST REPORT 19 (1939)
[hereinafter COUNCIL 1].
56. Id.
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for the benefit of their comments and review. The rules were
also published in an appendix to the Judicial Council's first re-
port to the legislature in 1939. In addition, this council report
included a recommendation that-subject to examination of
the proposed procedures by the bench and bar-the rules be
adopted by statute in Minnesota. 57 No action, however, on this
recommendation was taken during the following session of the
legislature. 58
In their second report, issued in 1941, the Judicial Council
summarized the legal profession's reaction to the proposed
rules. The response being mainly in favor of the rules, the
Council again recommended that the legislature make changes
to Minnesota's procedural code so that practice in Minnesota
would conform more closely with that of the federal courts.
59
In addition, the Council published the results of a Hennepin
County Bar Association poll concerning the proposed rules
and the rulemaking power. Members of the county bar were
asked if they preferred the supreme court or the legislature to
have the power over court procedures and the poll revealed
overwhelming support in favor of vesting the rulemaking
power in the judicial branch. 60
In 1942, the Judicial Council submitted two separate recom-
mendations to the legislature regarding the rulemaking power.
57. The Council also explained that "[flrom numerous sources has come the re-
quest that the Council consider the desirability of giving the Supreme Court power to
make rules .. ." Id. at 22. The Council commented, however, in a brief section on
the topic, that the subject had "not received the attention or study necessary" to take
any action or make any recommendation. Id.
58. The bar association's Committee On Rule-Making Power of Courts reported
as follows:
A majority of this committee believed it unwise to introduce a bill at the
1941 general session of the Legislature. One reason was that lawyers differ
so decidedly on the proposed changes recommended by the Judicial Council
that a bill adopting those changes would have little chance of passage. An-
other reason was that such a bill might injure other then pending bills rec-
ommended by this bar association....
The trend of opinion appears in favor of an act placing the rule making power in
the Supreme Court as the best means of accomplishing the desired object-better than
statutory detailed legislation.
Report of the Committee on Rule Making Power of Courts-Conformity of Minne-
sota and Federal Practice (1941) (emphasis added).
59. THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, SECOND REPORT 29
(1941) [hereinafter COUNCIL II].
60. The question posed to members of the bar was, "Do you favor giving the
surpreme [sic] court general power to make all rules governing proceedings in civil
actions rather than by legislative enactment?" Id. at 26-27. The result showed that
215 members voted "yes" and only 25 voted "no." Id.
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The first recommendation, published in the Council's third re-
port, was that a statute be passed to enable the supreme court
to promulgate its own rules of civil procedure. 6' The enabling
statute recommended by the Council was very similar to the
statute passed by Congress in 1934.62 The Council explained
some of the rulemaking advantages of the judiciary:
The making of procedural rules is a highly technical process
and should be in the hands of those with the widest experi-
ence and in most direct contact with their operation. It is
not a subject for anyone without legal training .... The
court is in constant session and is always available to make
the needed changes.
It is no criticism of the Legislature to say that the subject
is not one suited to the legislative process. The Legislature
is usually engaged in the consideration of a great number of
important public questions calling for immediate considera-
tion. It is not, therefore, in a position to give the time and
attention called for in considering numerous changes that
may be needed in the details of practice and procedure....
It is sound policy, it is believed, to place the burden and
responsibility for the procedure in our courts upon the
courts themselves. When defects in the administration of
justice are complained of it is the courts who are blamed.
The courts, therefore, should have the responsibility and
the ability to meet such criticism by such corrections of pro-
cedure as may be necessary.
63
61. THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, THIRD REPORT 12 (1942)
[hereinafter COUNCIL III].
62. Id. at 12 (proposed statute reproduced).
63. Id. at 16. The Council also explained the following with regard to the consti-
tutional ability of the legislature to delegate the rulemaking power to the court:
There is no constitutional difficulty in conferring the recommended rule-
making power upon our Supreme Court. Art. 6, Sec. 14, provides: "Legal
pleadings and proceedings in the courts of this State shall be under the di-
rection of the Legislature." This is merely an enabling clause and not a
restrictive one. It gives the Legislature power to legislate on the subject. It
does not purport to say that the power of the Legislature on the subject shall
be exclusive. Art. 3, Sec. 1, provides: "The power of government shall be
divided into three distinct departments . . . legislative, executive, and judi-
cial; and no person or persons belonging to or constituting one of these
departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of
the others, except in the instances expressly provided in this constitution. " [Italics in
original.] Art. 6, Sec. 14, was deemed necessary in order to enable the Legislature to
deal with the subject, and is thus a recognition that prescribing rules of practice and
procedure is fundamentally a judicial function. The Legislature may, therefore,
direct the court to prescribe these rules within the foregoing constitutional
provisions.
Id. at 17 (latter emphasis added).
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When the bill was submitted in the 1943 session of the legisla-
ture it failed in the senate by a vote of thirty-four to twenty-
eight.64 The bar association committee on rulemaking re-
ported that "[t]he objections ... apparently came partly from
misunderstanding and partly from differences of view respect-
ing the form of the bill."
65
The second proposal of the Judicial Council in 1942 was
more sweeping in scope: the Council's Committee on the Uni-
fication of the Courts recommended an entire revision of the
judiciary article in Minnesota's Constitution. The purpose was
to reorganize and modernize the court system, eliminate the
election of judges, and confer directly on the courts the
rulemaking power. 66 The proposed amendment would have
conferred full and unchecked rulemaking power on the
supreme court. 67 The Committee referred to the 1857 provi-
sion of the Minnesota Constitution granting the legislature the
power over court procedure as "archaic" and of "an earlier
day having a simpler civilization." 68
Under the proposed amendment, any statutes then in exist-
64. The following was explained later in a bar association committee report:
It was reported to pass by the Senate Judiciary Committee February 8th,
went on general orders, but on February 15th was defeated by a vote of
thirty-four against twenty-eight. On February 17th a motion to reconsider
was lost by a vote of twenty-four to thirty-six.
In the committee meetings of the House and Senate the measure was
explained and supported by Federal Judge John B. Sanborn, by Wilbur H.
Cherry and John F.D.Meighen .... and by Ex-Justice Maynard E. Pirsig, with
others. No substantial opposition developed at either committee hearing.
Report of Committee on Rule-Making Power of Courts-Conformity of Minnesota
and Federal Practice (1943).
65. Report of the Committee on Rule-Making Power of Courts-Conformity of
Minnesota and Federal Practice (1944).
66. See REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON THE UNIFICATION OF THE COURTS TO THE
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MINNESOTA (1942) [hereinafter COUNCIL IV].
67. "[The supreme court] may prescribe, for all divisions of the general court,
rules of practice and procedure and of evidence, and may delegate to the other divisions or
to the administrative council such rule-making power as its deems expedient." Id. at
11 (quoting from section two of the proposed judiciary article) (emphasis added).
68. The Committee explained:
The explanation of the inadequacy of our present judicial system lies in the
fact that it was adopted to meet the needs of an earlier day having a simpler
civilization and very different economic and social conditions. It has never
adjusted to the tempo of the present day, with all of its economic and social
complexities.... Our Constitution was adopted from other Constitutions
of still earlier adoption. It is not very surprising, therefore, that some of its
provisions should seem rather archaic to us of today. For example. it is now
agreed on all sides that the rule-making power belongs in the courts. Yet we
find in our Constitution a provision (Section 14 of Article VI), of undeter-
mined import, declaring that: "Legal pleadings and proceedings in the
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ence and inconsistent with the court's rules would be
superceded by court promulgated rules. It is doubtful that the
legislature, under this amendment, would have had the power
to pass any statutes concerning court procedure. 69 Although
the Committee's effort was nationally praised as an "outstand-
ing contribution to the science of judicial administration," 70
the recommendation was never adopted in Minnesota. "In the
state it received a cold, if not hostile reception, and no action,
legislative or otherwise, was taken onit.' 7 1
In June of 1944, the Judicial Council published a special
thirty-two page pamphlet titled "Revised Report on the Rule
courts of the State shall be under the direction of the legislature." It is time
that our whole judicial structure should be overhauled and modernized.
Id. at 7-8.
69. "All rules of the supreme court and of the administrative council adopted
pursuant to the authority conferred by this article. .. shall have the force and effect
of law and shall supersede all statutes and laws inconsistent therewith." Id. at 15
(quoting section ten of the proposed amendment).
70. See Minnesota Plans Thoroughly Modern Court System, 26 JOUR. AMER. JUD. Soc.
133 (1943). The Society commented:
Whether or not it is ever adopted by the people, the mere formulation of the
plan is an outstanding contribution to the science ofjudicial administration.
The significance of the statement that it brings together the best thinking
and experience on a variety of topics is revealed by an examination of its
text.... Section two [of the proposed amendment] adds Minnesota to the
growing list of states wherein the supreme court exercises full rule-making
power.
Id. at 133.
71. Pirsig, The Proposed Amendment of the Judiciary Article of the Minnesota Constitution,
40 MINN. L. REV. 815, 816 (1956).
Part of the hostility toward the recommendation came from Professor William
Anderson, a noted political scientist from the University of Minnesota and author of
THE HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF MINNESOTA. Anderson was opposed to the
full and unchecked rulemaking power that would have been granted to the courts.
He was also of the opinion-possibly because of the 1857 provision-that court pro-
cedure was a "legislative matter." He suggested "limited" legislative involvement
with rulemaking, as it operates on the federal level, where the judicial branch decides
the rules of procedure and, after a certain time period, if they are not disapproved by
a majority in each house, the rules have the effect of law. Anderson explained:
The ways of democracy are a little slow and cumbersome-but it is not nec-
essary to push them aside so completely to achieve most or all of the result
that is now desired. It is not essential to destroy the principle of legislative supremacy
in legislative matters, and some day when the present wave of judicial reform
has given way to other tendencies even the leaders of the bench and bar may
be thankful to have left in the hands of the people's chosen legislators the
power to correct the archaic rules of practice, procedure, and evidence that
then prevail.
Anderson, Reorganizing Minnesota's Judiciary, A Layman's View, 27 MINN. L. REV. 383,
389 (1943) (emphasis added).
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Making Power of the Supreme Court." 72 This report, intended
to persuade the Minnesota Legislature to confer rulemaking
on the supreme court, presented an extensive digest of the
rulemaking power in other states. 73 No proposal for an en-
abling act was submitted, however, in the 1945 session of the
legislature. 74 But in 1947, eleven years after the bar associa-
tion first took up the issue, the legislature finally passed an en-
abling act which allowed the supreme court to promulgate
rules of civil procedure.
75
The provisions contained in the act were nearly identical to
the first enabling act of Congress and the legislation recom-
mended by the Minnesota Judicial Council in their 1942 re-
port. The enabling act authorized the supreme court "to
regulate the pleadings, practice, procedure, and the forms
thereof in civil actions in all courts" of the state, provided that
the rules did not "abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive
rights of any litigant." 76 The court was directed to appoint an
advisory committee "consisting of eight members of the bar of
the state and at least two judges of the district courts and one
judge of a municipal court to assist" the supreme court "in
considering and preparing such rules as" they may adopt. 77
The legislature also provided the following provision:
All present laws relating to pleading, practice, and proce-
dure, excepting those applying to probate courts, shall be
effective as rules of court until modified or superseded by
subsequent court rule, and upon the adoption of any rule
pursuant to this act such laws, in so far as they are in conflict
therewith, shall thereafter be of no further force and
effect. 78
However, the legislators reserved the following right: "This act
shall not abridge the right of the legislature to enact, modify,
or repeal any statute or modify or repeal any rule of the
72. THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA: REVISED REPORT ON THE
RULE MAKING POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT (1944).
73. Id. at 14-32.
74. The bar association committee explained that "[t]o avoid overloading the
legislature with Bar Association bills, it was determined not to press for such legisla-
tion at the session just ended [1945]." Report of the Committee on Rule Making
Power of Courts and Conformity of Minnesota and Federal Practice (1945).
75. 1947 Minn. Laws, ch. 498, secs. 1-8 (approved April 23, 1947).
76. 1947 Minn. Laws, ch. 498, sec. 1.
77. 1947 Minn. Laws, ch. 498, sec. 2.
78. 1947 Minn. Laws, ch. 498, sec. 6.
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supreme court adopted pursuant thereto."' 79
Following the passage of the enabling act, the Minnesota
Supreme Court immediately formed an advisory committee to
prepare a draft of the civil rules. After more than two years of
work by the committee, these rules were submitted to the court
in 1950 and circulated among the bench and bar for comments
and debate. Subsequently, revisions were made by the com-
mittee and an open hearing was held by the court the following
year for the purpose of receiving public testimony on the rules.
The Rules of Civil Procedure were eventually adopted by the
court in 1951, effective January 1, 1952.80
In addition to the procedures, the court published two ap-
pendices regarding the statutes then in effect. Appendix A
listed statutory and special proceedings that were not gov-
erned by the new rules if inconsistent with or in conflict with
the procedure of such statutes. And Appendix B provided
cross-reference lists of those statutes that were superceded by
the rules."' In the interests of uniformity of practice, the new
Minnesota rules bore a strong resemblance to the federal rules
of civil procedure-even the numbering was similar.82 In later
years, as explained below, the Minnesota Legislature followed
the same enabling method in the areas of criminal procedure,
79. 1947 Minn. Laws, ch. 498, sec. 8.
80. For a short summary of this history, see 1J. HETLAND & 0. ADAMSON, MINNE-
SOTA PRACTICE: RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED at iii-vi (1970).
81. In 1959, the supreme court amended Rule 81.01(3) (formerly Rule 86.02) to
explicitly provide that all statutes, with the exception of those listed in Appendix A,
were superceded by the rules. According to the Advisory Committee notes, "For the
convenience of the bench and bar the Advisory Committee undertook to list super-
seded statutes in Appendix B, but since it cannot give assurance that all are included
it recommends this amendment to prevent possible misunderstandings as to the non-
exclusive character of Appendix B." G. YOUNGQUIST & B. BALCIK, MINNESOTA RULES
PRACTICE 115 (Supp. 1968). The following year the court ruled that Appendix B was
not an exclusive list of all statutes superceded by the rules. State v. Roban, 259
Minn. 88, 90, 107 N.W.2d 51, 53 (1960). See also infra notes 170-75 and accompany-
ing text.
82. As the author commented sometime later, however,
[t]he federal rules, and hence the Minnesota rules of procedure, have as
their starting point the best to be found in the Field Code and much of the
procedure under them varies little from the code. The difference between
the practice under the rules and that under the former Code is not as great
as lawyers experienced when states shifted from the old common law and
separate equity procedure to the Field Code.
PIRSIG, supra note 12, at 4.
For a collection of articles published at the time the rules were first promulgated,
see Symposium: Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, 36 MINN. L. REV. 565 (1952).
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evidence and juvenile procedure.83
C. The First Constitutional Commission
In 1947, a Constitutional Commission was formed by the
Minnesota Legislature to study the state's constitution and to
recommend changes, "if any," that were necessary to improve
the document.8 4 The Constitutional Commission formed aJu-
diciary Committee for the purpose of considering any revisions
necessary to the constitution's judiciary article. In 1948, the
Judiciary Committee published a draft of their proposed
amendment, which included an annotated commentary.8 5 The
purpose of publishing the committee's work was to survey and
solicit comments from the bench, bar, and others on the pro-
posed amendment.
The Committee's draft of the judiciary article recommended
that the original constitutional provision granting the power
over court procedure to the legislature be removed.86 It fur-
ther recommended that complete rulemaking power be vested
in the supreme court.87 The proposed constitutional language
read as follows: "After public notice and opportunity for hear-
ing thereon, [the supreme court] may prescribe rules of prac-
tice, procedure, and evidence for all courts, which rules may
not change any substantive right. It may delegate to other
courts appropriate rule-making power as to the practice and
procedure therein."'8 8 The annotation, however, explained,
"The Committee is in doubt whether the rule-making power
conferred upon the court should apply to evidence, and desires
the reaction of the bench and bar and others interested."
8 9
83. See infra notes 107-47 and accompanying text.
84. REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION OF MINNESOTA 9 (1948) [here-
inafter COMMISSION REPORT I]. The commission was divided into committees to dis-
cuss the constitution in subject categories. After each committee had completed its
preliminary investigation, it issued a report to the commission as a whole with their
recommendations for reform. The whole commission, after considering the various
committee reports, then issued a final report to the governor. Id.
85. Pirsig, Preliminary Report on Revision of the Judiciary Article of the Minnesota State
Constitution, 32 MINN. L. REV. 458 (1948).
86. Id. at 460.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (emphasis in original). The committee members questioned granting
rulemaking authority on evidence because the nature of rules on evidence are some-
times more substantive than procedural. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying
text.
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The response this received from the bench and bar was almost
completely in favor of vesting the rulemaking power-includ-
ing rules on evidence-in the supreme court.90
When the Judiciary Committee submitted their final report
to the full commission, they mysteriously omitted the rulemak-
ing provision. While at first they seemed committed to recom-
mending that the supreme court have full rulemaking power,
they now rejected the provision entirely and with no apparent
explanation. 9' The full commission, upon receipt of the Judi-
ciary Committee's report, included a provision recommending
that, "[r]ules of practice, procedure, and evidence for all
courts shall be made as provided by law. " 92 In other words,
court procedure would remain under the ultimate control of
the law-making body: the legislature. It is likely that this
phrase would have left the rulemaking power in the proposed
constitution essentially the same as it was in the original docu-
ment.98 The Commission's suggestions for amendments, how-
ever, did not receive the approval of the legislature and were
not submitted to the voters. The failure of the Commission's
suggestions to receive approval was probably due more to op-
position to other amendment suggestions than to the judiciary
article itself.94
90. The comments of lawyer Charles H. Richter were typical of most:
It is my belief that the men on the bench are best qualified to determine the
probative value of specific types of evidence. They are much more exper-
ienced in that respect than are the men in the legislature. The lawyers in the
legislature are naturally the best qualified of that group, but it often hap-
pens that we have lawyers in the legislature who are not skilled trial lawyers,
and who have much less experience with the probative force of evidentiary
facts of different kinds. Give the justices the power to establish, after public
notice and opportunity for hearing, and we should have the best rules of
evidence.
Letter from Charles H. Richter to Hon. Leroy E. Matson, Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, May 14, 1948 (original on file with the Minnesota Historical Society,
Manuscripts Division).
91. FINAL REPORT ON REVISION OF JUDICIARY ARTICLE OF MINNESOTA STATE CON-
STITUTION (1948). It is possible that the Committee decided the rulemaking provi-
sion was no longer entirely necessary since the legislature had recently passed an
enabling act allowing the supreme court to promulgate rules of civil procedure.
92. COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 84, at 42 (emphasis added).
93. The consultant to the Commission's Judiciary Committee wrote ten years
later that, "[a]rticle VI, as it appeared in the final report of the Commission, elimi-
nated many of the more liberal features of the preliminary draft and reduced to a
corresponding degree the changes it would effect in the existing judiciary article."
Pirsig, The Proposed Amendment of the Judiciary Article of the Minnesota Constitution, 40
MINN. L. REV. 815, 816-17 (1956).
94. Id. at 817.
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D. The Minnesota Bar Association and the 1956 Amendment of the
Judiciary Article
Despite the rejection of the wide scope of the first Constitu-
tional Commission's recommendations, many of the constitu-
tional changes the Commission suggested were eventually
adopted by individual amendment. 95 In 1955, under the guid-
ing hand of the Minnesota Bar Association, the legislature fi-
nally passed a revision of the judiciary article in the Minnesota
Constitution. The draft of the judiciary article that was intro-
duced in the legislature was in many respects a duplicate of the
1946 Constitutional Commission's efforts. In fact, Minnesota
Supreme Court Justice Leroy E. Matson, a member of the bar
association committee that was responsible for the proposal,
had been chairman for the Judiciary Committee of the Consti-
tutional Commission in the 1940s. On at least one important
point, the bar association's proposed judiciary article was an
exact duplicate of Matson's earlier commission report: the
rulemaking power was not mentioned.96
There is no evidence of any discussion of the court's
rulemaking power by the bar association when it prepared its
amendment proposal for the legislature. 97 There is also no in-
dication that the bar association's proposal received much
public debate by the legislators that approved the amend-
ment.98 In fact, the passage of the amendment through the
legislature appears to have been a sort of silent compromise: at
95. See Mitau, Constitutional Change by Amendment: Recommendations of the Minnesota
Constitutional Commission in Ten Years' Perspective, 44 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1960).
96. For a copy of the judiciary article as proposed by the bar association, see
Report of the Constitutional Revision Committee of the Minnesota State Bar Associ-
ation, reprinted in BENCH & B. MINN., May 1954, at 92-94.
The chairman of the bar association committee responsible for the amendment
of the judiciary article was Charles B. Howard. Mr. Howard wrote an article outlining
the changes in the judiciary article after the amendment was approved by the legisla-
ture but before its approval by the voters in 1956. According to Howard, "The Com-
mittee on Constitutional Revision of the Minnesota Bar Association adopted the
proposal of the Constitutional Commission with a few minor changes .... BENCH &
B. MINN., Feb. 1956, at 13. Howard then described the changes in the new judiciary
article but made no mention of the rulemaking power.
97. See Convention Proceedings of the Minnesota State Bar Association (1954)
(copy on file with the Minnesota State Bar Association; the Constitutional Revision
Committee discussion can be found on pp. 136-43).
98. See Minnesota House Judiciary Committee Journal, April 1955 (only copy is
stored at the Minnesota Historical Society, Manuscript Division). The Senate Judici-
ary Committee Journal for that session has been missing for years.
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the risk of losing all support for the bill, few suggestions for
changes were publicly proposed. 99
Following the passage of the bill by the legislature, it was
approved by the voters of Minnesota in the fall of 1956.100 Its
success was no doubt encouraged by a special committee
formed by the bar association "to conduct an active campaign
for the approval of the amendment."' 0 1 There has not been
any constitutional change in the rulemaking power since that
year and, as a result, rulemaking remains unmentioned in to-
day's judiciary article. While this legislative compromise may
have been politically convenient and expedient in 1955, the
long term effect of omitting the rulemaking provision was to
create the debate that exists today over which branch has the
ultimate authority.
E. The Second Constitutional Commission
In the seventies, another commission was formed to study
99. At the time of the amendment, Associate Justice Lawrence Yetka of the Min-
nesota Supreme Court was Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. He recalls
that the omission of the rulemaking provision was a compromise of sorts between
those forces that felt it should be under the court's control and those that felt it
should remain with the legislature. Justice Yetka also commented that the Minnesota
Bar Association-the sponsor of the bill to amend the judiciary article-was very
much opposed to any changes being made to their carefully drafted bill. The main
controversy at the time, however, was not the rulemaking power, instead the debate
involved the elimination of the justices of the peace and judicial redistricting. Tele-
phone interview with Lawrence Yetka, Associate Justice of the Minnesota Supreme
Court (Oct. 13, 1987).
The late Professor G. Theodore Mitau of Macalester College, in a 1960 analysis
of the first constitutional commission's proposals and their eventual acceptance,
seemed to agree that the omission of the rulemaking provision was a compromise:
There is something in the very nature of the amendment process, namely,
that it is difficult to debate selected aspects of a proposed amendment with-
out endangering its passage and thus forfeiting the many real reforms latent
in the measure as a whole. Critics of the judiciary article, for example, may
well have felt concern over the extent to which rules of evidence and proce-
dure might pass out of the hands of the judiciary, and they may have feared
loss of the independence of the judiciary from other branches of govern-
ment; and yet the benefits of the proposed amendment so far outweighed
these misgivings that many of them voted for it notwithstanding.
Mitau, supra note 95, at 480.
100. In the general election on 6 November 1956, 939,957 voted "yes" and
307,178 voted "no" on the amendment.
101. Proceedings of the Minnesota State Bar Association, June 24, 1955, reprinted
in BENCH & B. MINN., Sept. 1955, at 36. This committee was formed on the recom-
mendation of Charles B. Howard and the bar association's Constitutional Revision
Committee.
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possible revisions to the state constitution. 10 2 The rulemaking
power was considered by this commission, as it was by the first
constitutional commission over twenty years before. The or-
ganization of this second commission-composed primarily of
legislators-was similar to the commission of the forties in that
committees were formed to complete the preliminary research
and report to the commission as a whole. In the Judicial
Branch Committee Report of 1972, the members recom-
mended that the following provision be adopted in Minne-
sota's Constitution: "The supreme court shall adopt rules
governing the administration, admissibility of evidence, prac-
tice and procedure in all courts. These rules may be changed
by the Legislature by a two thirds vote of the members elected
to each house."' 0 3 The members of the Committee com-
mented, "The legislature has gradually recognized that this is
really a function which is better served by the courts
themselves." 
0 4
The Commission as a whole, with slight changes to the
wording, agreed.' 0 5 The Commission explained:
102. "The Constitutional Study Commission of 1972 was authorized by Chapter
806, Laws of Minnesota 1971, adopted by the Legislature on June 4, 1971. The stat-
ute provided for a commission of 21 members .. " MINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL
STUDY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 6 (1973) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT II].
103. MINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY COMMISSION, JUDICIAL BRANCH COMMIT-
TEE REPORT 9 (1972).
104. Id. The full comments of the committee were as follows:
This provision is entirely new. In the past, the legislature has provided for
these matters by law. At one time, the legislature passed detailed codes of
procedure for criminal and civil cases and rules for the administration of
courts, setting term dates, etc. The legislature has gradually recognized that
this is really a function which is better served by the courts themselves. Ac-
cordingly, it has delegated substantial control over court administration to
the Judicial Council (see MS 483.01-483.04) and the power to adopt rules
for civil and criminal cases to the supreme court (see MS 480.05-480.059).
The provision proposed here would have double impact. The ability of
the supreme court to adopt rules for judicial administration would assist the
court in the implementation of a unified judicial system. The unified court
should promote the efficient utilization of judicial manpower.
By ad hoc decisions the supreme court has, in effect, adopted rules of
evidence. The authority granted in the proposed section would permit the
adoption of an integrated, comprehensive code of evidence. In either case,
the legislature could, by extraordinary majority, override the rules made by
the supreme court. The ultimate responsibility of the legislature is thus rec-
ognized, but the section also acknowledges that the familiarity and compe-
tence of the judiciary in these areas should be given great weight.
Id. at 9-10.
105. The final report of the Constitutional Commission, issued in 1973, suggested
the following phraseology: "The Supreme Court should adopt rules governing the
administration, admissibility of evidence, practice and procedure in all courts. These
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This proposed change would promote uniformity in lower
courts and provide guidance to the bench and bar through a
readily accessible code. It would permit adoption of inte-
grated and comprehensive rules of evidence now accom-
plished on a case-by-case basis by the Supreme Court. The
Legislature could, by a two-thirds majority, override a
Supreme Court decision with respect to rules of evidence,
practice and procedure. The change thus recognizes the prevail-
ing competence of the judiciary in these areas and its fundamental
constitutional responsibility, but permits the Legislature to dis-
charge its duty of responding to the needs of the citizens
they represent in a democratic manner.
10 6
The Commission's suggested amendment does not seem to
have found any favor or attention in the legislature since the
publication of the Commission's report.
F. Recent Rulemaking by the Minnesota Supreme Court
Since 1951, when the Rules of Civil Procedure were first
adopted in Minnesota, the state supreme court has developed
procedural rules in a number of areas and continues to actively
make revisions and reforms. In almost all instances, the court
was acting out of need when it adopted a uniform set of rules:
the procedure in the area was often ambiguous-a concoction
of lower court rules, statutes and court decisions-and practic-
ing attorneys were sometimes unsure of the proper rules to
follow. The supreme court's rules helped to clear up this con-
fusion and promote uniformity; they also provided a certain
degree of consistency with federal rules.
In most areas of procedure, the court did not adopt rules
until an enabling act was passed by the legislature. In Justice
Scott's words, the court "stepped gingerly" when developing
rules and tried to respect and comport with the desires of the
legislative branch of government. 0 7 In a few areas, however,
namely, appellate procedures and family court procedures, the
court appears to have developed rules based on their inherent
rulemaking power. This section will briefly describe each of
the areas in which supreme court rules are presently in place.
rules should be subject to change by the Legislature by a two-thirds vote of each
house." COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 102, at 23 (emphasis denotes change).
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Scott, Rules Changes in Minnesota: How the Rule Making Process Work 18 CRIM.
Jus. INST., MINN. C.L.E. 491, 495 (1983).
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Civil Procedure. Since the Rules of Civil Procedure were first
adopted by the court in 1952, numerous revisions have
occurred:
Significant amendments were made to the [rules] in 1959
and in 1968. These amendments corrected errors, resolved
ambiguities, and again restored substantial conformity be-
tween the Minnesota rules and the federal rules.... Exten-
sive amendments to the rules were adopted by the [supreme
court] in 1975 and in 1985. These changes resolved some
conflicts and incorporated some, not all, of the changes to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .... 108
The most recent amendments to the rules were considered by
the court in June of 1988.109 In each instance in which the
court was considering changes, an advisory committee was ap-
pointed for the purpose of studying revisions, comparing the
federal rules, and recommending amendments."l0
Appellate Court Procedure. The Rules of Appellate Procedure
were first adopted by the supreme court in 1967, after several
years of study by the court's advisory committee.II' The rules
were patterned after the Proposed Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure and were designed to govern all civil appeals in the
state of Minnesota." t2 These rules were apparently promul-
gated by the court based on their inherent powers; and
adopted in the absence of an explicit prior legislative enabling
act allowing the court to promulgate rules that would
supercede legislative statutes."13  These appellate rules
108. 1 D. HERR & R. HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: CIVIL RULES ANNOTATED
vii-viii (2d ed. 1985).
109. See also infra note 202.
110. See, e.g., Order of the Supreme Court, Appointments to the Supreme Court
Advisory Committee on Civil Procedure, October 7, 1983, reprinted in Minn. Rep.
339-343 N.W.2d xxix (1983). Apparently, this Committee was appointed by the
court for a pre-determined term: "IT IS ORDERED that effective November 1, 1983,
the following persons be, and hereby are, appointed to membership on the Supreme
Court Advisory Committee on Civil Procedure for terms expiring December 31,
1987." Id.
11l. See Adamson, The New Appeal Rules, BENCH & BAR MINN., Jan. 1968, at 5. See
also Order of Supreme Court Prescribing and Promulgating New Rules of Civil Ap-
pellate Procedure in the Supreme Court, December 7, 1967 (issued by then Chief
Justice Oscar Knutson), reprinted in 277 Minn. i (1967).
112. Under the current rules, an appeal in a criminal case is governed by the Rules
of Civil Appellate Procedure except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 28.01, subd 2.
113. The following statute was in place at the time, but does not mention any
power to supercede statutes: "The supreme court shall have all the authority neces-
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superceded over one hundred years of legislation in the area
and, in particular, the legislature's Civil Appeal Code of
1963. I 4 In recent years, another advisory committee was ap-
pointed by the court to consider amendments to the Rules of
Civil Appellate Procedure. After months of study and an open
hearing, the court adopted these amendments in 1983. l15
Criminal Procedure. The first enabling act passed by the legis-
lature after the enabling act for the rules of civil procedure was
in 1971. This act prompted the supreme court to create and
adopt the present Rules of Criminal Procedure." t 6 Before the
rules were adopted by the court, criminal procedure in the trial
courts of Minnesota was governed by a "hodge-podge of legis-
lation, supreme court decisions, and local court rules and cus-
toms.," 7 A uniform statewide set of criminal procedures had
been a recognized goal for many years. 1 8 These modern rules
today govern the procedure for felonies, gross misdemeanors,
misdemeanors and petty misdemeanors in all Minnesota dis-
trict courts.'19
When the enabling act for criminal rules was first passed by
the legislature, the following precautionary provision was in-
cluded: "Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to grant
sary for carrying into execution its judgments and determinations. . . . Such court
shall prescribe, and from time to time may amend and modify, rules of practice
therein .. " MINN. STAT. § 480.05 (1986).
The legislature, with the advent of the court of appeals, has also since passed
another statute that enables the supreme court and appellate court to promulgate
rules governing appellate procedure. See 1982 Minn. Laws, ch. 501, § 13 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 480A.11 (1986)).
114. MINN. STAT. §§ 605.01-605.225 (repealed in 1974 Minn. Laws, ch. 394, § 11).
See 3 E. MAGNUSON, D. HERR & R. HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: APPELLATE RULES
ANNOTATED iv (2d ed. 1985). In the original appellate procedures of 1967, Rule
147.02 provided: "Upon the taking of effect of these rules the statutes listed in Ap-
pendix A are superceded with respect to practice and procedure in the Supreme
Court." MINN. R. CIVIL APP. P. 147.02 (deleted in 1983). The appendix listing stat-
utes superceded by the rules was not included in the revision of the rules in 1983.
115. See Order Promulgating Amendments to the Rules of Civil Appellate Proce-
dure, November 10, 1983 (issued by ChiefJustice Douglas Amdahl), reprinted in Minn.
Rep. 339-343 N.W.2d lxxxix (1983). The Advisory Committee for Civil Appellate
Rules has not disbanded, but information is unavailable about any meetings subse-
quent to 1983.
116. See 1971 Minn. Laws, ch. 250.
117. 1 H. MCCARR, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: MINNESOTA CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCE-
DURE § 3 (1976).
118. See Rules of Criminal Procedure, BENCH & BAR MINN., june 1955, at 59 (early
editorial advocating such rules).
119. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 1.01.
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the supreme court power to amend or modify any statute."' 20
Nevertheless, the advisory committee appointed by the court
produced a draft of rules that would have resulted in "the
modification, amendment or repeal of virtually all Minnesota
statutes governing criminal procedure."' 2' Considering the
extensive work completed by the advisory committee, such re-
visions were apparently the intention of the court. 122 The ac-
tions of the court and its committee also suggest that the court
believed it had the inherent authority to exceed the legislative
restrictions in the enabling act.
123
120. 1972 Minn. Laws, ch. 250, sec. 7. The legislature also reserved the right to
"enact, modify, or repeal any statute or modify or repeal any rule of the supreme
court .... " 1972 Minn. Laws, ch. 250, sec. 8. The latter provision was essentially the
same as the right reserved in the civil procedure enabling act of 1947. See supra note
79 and accompanying text.
121. Brief of Minnesota Public Defenders Association in Opposition to Adoption
of the Rules at 5 (January 21, 1975) (copy on file at the Minnesota Supreme Court)
(emphasis in original). The Public Defenders Association protested:
As the very [size of the proposed rules] suggests, the Committee vastly ex-
ceeded the authority available to it under § 480.059; their work would both
affect numerous substantive rights and result in the modification, amend-
ment or repeal of virtually all Minnesota Statutes governing criminal proce-
dure. In at least one instance the Committee flew directly in the face of the
clear language of the Constitution: former section 23.116, providing for
eleven-twelfths verdicts in gross misdemeanor cases obviously violated Arti-
cle I Sec. 4, a compromise admittedly insisted upon by prosecutors on the
Committee as a prerequisite to their approval of the entire Proposed Rules.
Id. The authority cited for the last statement quoted read as follows: "[R]emarks of
Committee member [David] Graven at the hearing in February, 1974." Id. at n.4.
122. The advisory committee spent nearly four years working on the proposed
rules; extensive studies were completed and compared; a draft of the rules was sent
to attorneys and judges; public meetings were held around the state by the commit-
tee; and an open hearing was eventually held by the court before the rules were
adopted in 1975. For a description of the process used to adopt the criminal rules,
see Scott, An Overview of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure (1975) (reprinted in
the preliminary material of the Rules of Criminal Procedure in MINNESOTA RULES OF
COURT 101 (West 1988)). See also H. McCarr, The New Rules-A Plus for Both the Prose-
cution and the Defense, HENNEPIN LAWYER, May-June 1975, at 4.
The advisory committee was also specifically instructed by ChiefJustice Knutson
to examine the then existing American Bar Association Standards of Criminal Justice
with a view to their implementation.
123. A comment in an American Judicature Society's survey of all the state
supreme courts and their rulemaking power also indicates that at least some justices
on the Minnesota court may have taken this approach:
The Judicial Article [of the Minnesota Constitution] does not clearly define
the locus of the rule-making power. However, at least one provision must
be mentioned, for it relates in an indirect way to the status of the state's
rule-making power. That provision vest the judicial power of the state in the
Supreme Court, among others. Minn. Const. art. VI, § 1 .... It should be
noted that some members of the current Supreme Court would interpret
Section 1 as the basis of such inherent judicial power.
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The legislature eventually responded to the court by amend-
ing the enabling act so that criminal procedural statutes would
be superceded by the court's promulgated rules. 124 The legis-
lature stated, however, that a number of statutes were to re-
main in full force and effect despite the court's rules. These
exceptions are listed in the present enabling act.'
25
Evidence. In 1977, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted
the present Rules of Evidence.126 Prior to their adoption, Min-
nesota did not have a uniform evidence code. "Evidentiary
rulings often were totally dependent on the common sense-
and sometimes the whim-of the trial judge.' 27 In 1975, an
enabling act passed by the legislature prompted the court into
acting in much the same fashion as they had with the criminal
rules.' 28 The advisory committee appointed by the court spent
the following two years completing their work. In addition to
extensive studies, the advisory committee circulated a draft of
the rules to the bench and bar, and held two hearings for pub-
lic debate. Before the rules were adopted, the court also held
an open hearing to hear public testimony. 29 The rules even-
tually adopted by the court were designed with the common
J. PARNESS & C. KORBAKES, A STUDY OF THE PROCEDURAL RULE-MAKING POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES 41 (1973). The statement quoted above was footnoted as follows:
"This information was obtained from a letter to the American Judicature Society
from the Minnesota Supreme Court which is now on file at the Society's main office."
Id. Efforts to locate that letter have failed.
124. 1974 Minn. Laws, ch. 390, sec. 1.
125. 1974 Minn. Laws, ch. 390, sec. 7 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 480.059 subd. 7
(1986)). These statute exceptions included the following provision: "The supreme
court shall not have the power to adopt or promulgate any rule requiring less than
unanimous verdicts in criminal cases." MINN. STAT. § 480.059 subd. 7(i) (1986). See
supra note 121.
126. See Thompson, The New Rules of Evidence, BENCH & BAR MINN., Sept. 1977, at
31.
127. Keyes, Foreword to 2 P. THOMPSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: EVIDENCE vi (1979).
The desire for a uniform set of rules was even mentioned by the Second Constitu-
tional Commission as an incentive for explicitly granting the rulemaking power to the
courts. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
128. See MINN. STAT. § 480.0591 (1986). Just as they had done with criminal pro-
cedure, the legislature limited the areas in which the court could promulgate rules.
The following statutes were listed by the legislature as not within the limits of the
court's power: statutes which relate to the competency of witnesses to testify; statutes
which establish the prima facie evidence as proof of a fact; statutes which establish a
presumption or a burden of proof; statutes which relate to the privacy of communica-
tions; and statutes which relate to the admissibility of certain documents. See MINN.
STAT. § 480.0591, subd. 6 (1986).
129. THOMPSON, supra note 126, at 31.
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law principles of evidence in mind. They were also modeled
on the then newly adopted Federal Rules of Evidence. 3 0 Re-
cently, in May of 1988, the supreme court formed another ad-
visory committee to reconsider the rules and recommend
changes to the court.' 3 ' This committee is now in the process
of hearing testimony and holding meetings, as its predecessor
did ten years before.1
3 2
Juvenile Court Procedure. The Rules of Procedure for Juvenile
Court were adopted by the court in 1983. Prior to 1983, pro-
cedure for juvenile proceedings in Minnesota was not gov-
erned by a uniform set of rules. "Hennepin County and
Ramsey County had Rules that had evolved from their respec-
tive court. The remaining outstate courts had available to
them the Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Court Proceedings in
the Minnesota Probate-Juvenile Courts."' 133 As a cure for this
confusing array of rules and redundancy, an enabling act was
passed in 1980 by the legislature. 34 In response, the supreme
court, through its Juvenile Justice Study Commission, ap-
pointed a task force for the purpose of drafting a uniform set
of rules. 1 5 After more than two years of work, the proposed
rules were presented to the court and a public hearing was
held to consider them before adoption. These rules have now
been in force since 1983.136
Family Court Procedure. Prior to 1986, the only formal proce-
dural rules in use for family court dissolution matters were
those first adopted by the County Court Judges Association in
1978. There was some question though as to whether the As-
sociation's rules applied to the Family Court Divisions of Ram-
sey and Hennepin counties-those courts being a part of the
district court structure. 3 7 In June of 1985, the Uniform Rules
130. Id.
131. See Order of the Supreme Court Appointing Members to Supreme Court Ad-
visory Committee on Rules of Evidence, C3-84-2138, May 4, 1988, reprinted in Minn.
Rep. 420-422 N.W. 2d lxxvii (1988).
132. See infra note 192.
133. J. SONSTENG & R. SCOTT, MINNESOTA PRACTICE:JUVENILE LAW AND PRACTICE V
(1985).
134. See MINN. STAT. § 480.0595 (1986).
135. See SONSTENG & Scorr, supra note 133, at v.
136. See Order of the Supreme Court, In Re Adopted Rules of Procedure forJuve-
nile Court, May 1, 1983, reprinted in Minn. Rep. 328-332 N.W.2d xliii (1983).
137. See Savoren v. Savoren, 386 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). See also
N. DAVIDSON, MINNESOTA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE MANUAL § 3.01 (1988).
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Committee of the Family Law Section of the Minnesota State
Bar Association petitioned the supreme court for the forma-
tion of an advisory committee to investigate and draft rules
that would be published and implemented statewide.'
3 8
By order of the court in October of 1985, an advisory com-
mittee was formed. 139 After considerable effort, the committee
submitted their proposed rules to the court in 1986 and an
order was issued for an open hearing to be held. Following
that hearing, the present Rules of Family Court Procedure
were adopted by the court.' 40 There was no enabling act
passed by the legislature for family court procedure. It could
be assumed that family court procedure was within the bounds
of the civil procedure enabling act, but in the court's order for
an open hearing a justice of the court explicitly stated that the
court "has the inherent power to promulgate Rules of Family
Court Procedure."141
Probate Court Procedure. Probate rules have a unique history.
For the past ten years, the rules in place for probate matters
were those formed and adopted by the Minnesota County
Judges Association in 1978.142 Those rules, however, were
considered insufficient, so the supreme court issued an order
in 1984, appointing an advisory committee for the purpose of
studying, drafting, and recommending "uniform rules for the
handling and disposition of probate matters in the courts of
this state." 143 After two years of work, the advisory committee
submitted a draft of proposed rules to the court in 1986. An
open hearing was held to receive testimony and letters of ad-
vice were sent to the court from interested parties around the
138. See Petition for Formation of Supreme Court Committee for Enactment of
Uniform Rules of Procedure for Family Court Dissolution Matters in the State of
Minnesota, filed with the court by the Uniform Rules Committee of the Family Law
Section of the Minnesota State Bar Association on June 11, 1985 (copy on file with
the supreme court).
139. See Order of Minnesota Supreme Court (October 10, 1985) (copy on file at
the Minnesota Supreme Court; this order was apparently not reprinted in the MINNE-
SOTA REPORTER).
140. See R. FAMILY C. PRO.
141. Order for Hearing to Adopt Rules of Family Court Procedure (August 7,
1986) (issued by Justice Lawrence Yetka) (copy on file at the Minnesota Supreme
Court; this order was apparently not reprinted in the MINNESOTA REPORTER).
142. See PROB. CT. R. (published in MINNESOTA RULES OF COURT (1988)).
143. Order of Supreme Court (January 24, 1984), reprinted in Minn. Rep. 339-343
N.W.2d c (1984).
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state.' 44 In the end, however, the court refused to adopt the
probate rules because the civil rules enabling act of the 1940s
explicitly stated that the supreme court's rulemaking power
did not include probate courts. 145 The statute therefore was
amended in 1987,146 with little or no controversy in the legisla-
ture, 147 and the court scheduled another hearing for January
1989. Thus a constitutional conflict with the legislature was
avoided.
II. THE SOURCE AND SCOPE OF THE PROCEDURAL
RULEMAKING POWER IN MINNESOTA
There is considerable variation among the states concerning
the source and extent of the rulemaking power. 48 Each state
is unique and varies according to its own history, constitutional
provisions, statutes, court decisions and customs. For those
states with an explicit constitutional provision regarding court
procedure, the rulemaking power is usually either: (1) an ex-
clusive power of the judicial branch; or (2) a power shared in
some fashion between the branches of government. 49 For
144. This information is a matter of public record and on file with the Minnesota
Supreme Court Administrator's Office.
145. MINN. STAT. § 480.051 (1986). The first provision of the enabling act said,
"The supreme court of this state shall have the power to regulate the pleadings,
practice, procedure, and the forms thereof in civil action in all courts of this state,
other than theprobate courts, by rules promulgated by it from time to time." Id. (empha-
sis added).
146. See 1987 Minn. Laws, ch. 377, sec. 5.
147. Telephone interview with the Honorable MelvinJ. Peterson, Chairman of the
Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Probate Rules (Sept. 16, 1988).
148. For a brief description of the source, extent and process of rulemaking in all
of the states, see D. PUGH, C. KORBAKES, J. ALFINI & C. GRAu, JUDICIAL RULEMAKING,
A COMPENDIUM (1984).
149. According to a recent article there are twenty-eight states with explicit consti-
tutional provisions relating to procedural rulemaking. See Browde and Occhialino,
supra note 3, at 477-83. This article lists nine states with constitutional provisions
that give exclusive authority over procedural rules to the judiciary: Arizona, Colo-
rado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Michigan, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and West
Virginia. Id. at 477-79. For example, the Michigan Constitution states: "The
supreme court shall by general rules establish, modify, amend and simplify the prac-
tice and procedure in all courts." MIcH. CONST. art. VI § 5. (For a brief explanation
of the origin of Michigan's constitutional provision and how it relates to Minnesota,
see supra note 22.)
Nineteen states, according to Browde and Occhialino, have constitutions with
provisions that share the rulemaking power: Alabama, Alaska, California, Florida,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
See Browde and Occhialino, supra note 3, at 480-83. For example, the Florida Consti-
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those states without an explicit provision, the source of the
rulemaking power has usually been determined to be either:
(1) an exclusive power of the judiciary based on their inherent
powers; or (2) a power held concurrently by the judiciary and
legislature (usually delegated to the judiciary by an enabling
act).1 5
0
A. The Inherent Power of the Court to Promulgate Rules
As explained above, Minnesota does not have an explicit
constitutional provision regarding the procedural rulemaking
power. The state constitution, however, has always acknowl-
edged the separation of powers between the three branches of
government and provided that the judicial power of the state
be vested in the supreme court.' 5 ' Together, these constitu-
tional statements serve as the foundation for the supreme
court's inherent powers.
The Minnesota Supreme Court explained the following in In
re Disbarment of Greathouse :152
The judicial power of this court has its origin in the consti-
tution contains a provision similar to that recommended by the Second Constitu-
tional Commission in Minnesota: "The supreme court shall adopt rules for the
practice and procedure in all courts.... These rules may be repealed by general law
enacted by two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the Legislature."
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2.
150. Connecticut is an example of a state in which the appellate court has deter-
mine procedural rulemaking to be inherent and exclusive power of the judiciary. See
State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 522, 290 A.2d 327 (1971)(act of legislature establishing a
procedure for the discovery of prosecution witness statements held unconstitu-
tional). For a criticism of State v. Clemente, see Kay, The Rulemaking Authority and Separa-
tion of Powers in Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. REV 1 (1975). For a list of states in which
appellate courts have determined rulemaking is an inherent and exclusive power of
the judiciary see infra note 167.
Kansas is an example of a state that recognizes rulemaking as a concurrent
power of the legislature and judiciary: "Responsibility for procedural rulemaking
rests in both the legislature and the supreme court. The legislature has adopted
codes of criminal and civil procedure. However, it has recognized the inherent
power of the court to supplement or amend the codes insofar as they pertain to
pleadings, practice or procedure .. " JUDICIAL RULEMAKING, A COMPENDIUM, supra
note 148, at 84.
151. For the complete text of the separation of powers article in Minnesota's Con-
stitution see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
Article VI provides: "Thejudicial power of the state is vested in a supreme court,
a court of appeals, if established by the legislature, a district court and such other
courts, judicial officers and commissioners with jurisdiction inferior to the district
court as the legislature may establish." MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
152. 189 Minn. 51, 248 N.W. 735 (1933) (unethical practices of an attorney sub-
ject to the inherent power of the court to discipline).
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tution, but when the court came into existence, it came with
inherent powers. Such power is the right to protect itself,
to enable it to administer justice whether any previous form
of remedy has been granted or not. This same power au-
thorizes the making of rules of practice.
153
The Minnesota Supreme Court gave a thorough account of the
nature and scope of its inherent powers in the dicta of In Re
Clerk of Court's Compensation for Lyon County v. Lyon County
Commissioners: 1
54
Inherent judicial power governs that which is essential to
the existence, dignity, and function of a court because it is a
court. Its source is the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers as expressed and implied in our constitution. Its
scope is the practical necessity of ensuring the free and full
exercise of the court's vital function-the disposition of in-
dividual cases to deliver remedies for wrongs and "justice
freely and without purchase; completely and without denial;
promptly and without delay, conformable to the laws."'
55
The doctrine of inherent powers is not invoked with much
frequency by the Minnesota Supreme Court; its use has been
primarily limited to maintaining control over the bar and prac-
tice of law.' 56 The court has, however, on occasion noted that
the ability to determine procedural rules falls within the scope
of their inherent powers. For example, the Minnesota
153. Id. at 55, 248 N.W. at 737.
154. 308 Minn. 172, 241 N.W.2d 781 (1976) (a court order to set a clerk's salary
unconstitutional when an express constitutional provision provided that the salary
would be controlled by the legislature).
155. Id. at 176-77, 241 N.W.2d at 784 (citations and footnotes omitted) (quoting
MINN. CONsT. art. 1, § 8).
156. See the line of case establishing this power: Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn.
416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973) (court rules govern when a statute conflicts regarding
the disposition of bar fees); In re Petition for Integration of the Bar of Minnesota,
216 Minn. 195, 12 N.W.2d 515 (1943) (within court's inherent power to order inte-
gration of the state bar); Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940)
(legislative statute regarding practice of law accepted by the court as a matter of com-
ity); In re Disbarment of Tracy, 197 Minn. 35, 266 N.W. 88 (1936) (legislative enact-
ment regarding the statute of limitations governing disbarment proceedings is
unconstitutional); In re Disbarment of Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 248 N.W. 735,
(1933) (court is constitutionally empowered to disbar an attorney without legislative
authorization). See also Note, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary to Regulate the
Practice of Law-A Proposed Delineation, 60 MINN. L. REV. 783 (1976) (criticizing
the court's decision in Sharood v. Hatfield that the judiciary has exclusive control
over the bar and practice of law).
For an account of the various applications of the inherent power of the judicial
branch in other states, see J. CATSLEY, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS (1980).
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Supreme Court explained that rules of evidence are an inher-
ent power of the court in State v. Willis:
t 57
Inherently, the courts have the power to establish rules of
evidence. Northern States Power Company v. Esperson, 274
Minn. 451, 456, 144 N.W.2d 372, 376 (1966). 1 Wigmore on
Evidence (1982 Supp.), § 7a at 75-76, states that the judicial
function constitutionally empowers the courts to make their
own rules of procedure, including rules of evidence, and
this prerogative of the courts to formulate and alter rules of
evidence ought not to be doubted. 158
The inherent power of the court to establish rules of proce-
dure existed even during the one hundred year period when
Minnesota's Constitution explicitly vested the power in the
legislative branch. This power, of course, was not to be exer-
cised if procedures were already provided by the legislature.15
9
In more recent times, the court has also mentioned its inherent
power to determine procedure in various court orders; and the
experiences with appellate procedure and family court proce-
dure are apparently examples of its inherent power in use.'
60
157. 332 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 1983).
158. Id. at 184.
159. For example, in Whaley v. Bayer, 99 Minn. 397, 109 N.W. 820 (1906), the
court explained:
It is true that the legislature has not designated the manner in which [an
election contest] shall be heard in the district court, but when jurisdiction
over a subject-matter is conferred upon a court, and the details of the proce-
dure are not provided for, the court will establish and adopt such procedure
as is necessary to render the grant of jurisdiction effective.
Id. at 399, 109 N.W. at 821. See also Oronoco School District v. Town of Oronoco,
170 Minn. 49, 212 N.W. 8 (1927).
160. A 1987 court order regarding the use of facsimile transmission explained:
"WHEREAS, the Supreme Court has the inherent and statutory authority pursuant to
Minn. Stat. § 2.724, subdivision 4; Minn. Stat. §§ 480.05; .051; .0591; and .0595 to
regulate pleadings, practice, and procedure in the trial courts of this state .. " Order Regard-
ing the Experimental Use of Facsimile Transmission, Sept. 21, 1987, reprinted in MIN-
NESOTA RULES OF COURT ix (1988) (emphasis added).
For another example, consider the following statement in the recent Case Dispo-
sitional Procedures of the supreme court: "The Minnesota Constitution, in Article
VI, § 2, confers upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in remedial cases as
prescribed by law, appellate jurisdiction in all cases and supervisory jurisdiction over
all courts of the state. The court's supervisory jurisdiction includes the authority to regulate
procedural and evidentiay matters. " Case Dispositional Procedures of the Supreme
Court, Oct. 19, 1988, reprinted in 429 NORTHWESTERN REPORTER 2D Advance Sheets,
No. 3, at lv (emphasis added).
Appellate procedures were first promulgated by the court without an enabling
act. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text. Family court procedures were
also promulgated without a specific enabling act. See supra notes 137-41 and accom-
panying text.
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Although procedural rulemaking is clearly an inherent
power of the Minnesota Supreme Court, it does not follow
from this statement that enabling legislation was never neces-
sary for the court to promulgate rules. The first enabling act
passed by the legislature in 1947 was a necessity: at the time
Minnesota's Constitution required that pleadings and proceed-
ings be under the direction of the legislative body. 161 If the
court was to promulgate a complete set of procedural rules
that would supercede the legislative statutes, the legislature
had to provide the permission and direction through enabling
legislation. 162 It is our position, however, that when that provi-
sion was removed from the constitution in 1956, the conse-
quence was that the rulemaking power became an implicit and
necessary function and responsibility of the inherent judicial
power conferred by the constitution in the judicial branch.
The enabling acts that have been passed by the legislature
since the revision of the constitution have merely served to
prompt the judiciary into promulgating otherwise desirable
rules. 163
B. The Scope of the Court's Rulemaking Power
The inherent power of the Minnesota Supreme Court to
promulgate procedural rules raises at least two practical issues
161. As explained above, prior to 1956, the Minnesota Constitution explicitly
vested the rulemaking power in the legislative branch.
162. During the first one hundred years of Minnesota's Constitution, this provi-
sion left little doubt that the procedural rulemaking power ultimately was under the
direction of the legislature. For example, in Bloom v. American Express Co., 222
Minn. 249, 23 N.W.2d 570 (1946), the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged this
constitutional delegation of power to the legislative branch:
Under that provision [Art. 6, § 14], there can be no doubt that as to proce-
dure the legislature must first act to create the necessary statutory directives.
No other department of government has such power. A constitutional grant
of power to one of the three departments of government, and thereby so
designated, "is a denial to the others."
Id. at 256, 23 N.W.2d at 575 (citation omitted).
163. Procedural rulemaking as a fundamental judicial function absent any con-
trary constitutional provision was recognized by the Minnesota Judicial Council in
the 1940s. See supra note 63.
Other states have ruled in the manner we are suggesting. The Arkansas
Supreme Court, for example, explained the following with regard to their state's en-
abling legislation in Miller v. State, 262 Ark. 223, 555 S.W.2d 563 (1977): "[W]e
implicitly reject[ed] the argument advanced here that we had no inherent rule mak-
ing authority absent an enabling statute. The enabling act here merely recognizes
and is harmonious with this court's inherent powers rather than conferring an ex-
press power." Id. at 226, 555 S.W.2d at 564.
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as a consequence. First, the legislature, probably unaware of
their doubtful status, will likely continue to enact statutes with
provisions that seek to govern court proceedings. This
presents to the supreme court the problem of how it should
deal with these statutes in the exercise of its inherent power.
Second, the issue still remains regarding the scope or limits of
the court's inherent power. To what extent should the
supreme court promulgate rules? This last issue turns on the
distinction between procedural and substantive law. We be-
lieve, as described below, that a cooperative relationship
should exist between the court and the legislature on both of
these issues.
1. The Ultimate Power over Procedure
It is our position that the legislature, as an incident of the
separation of powers, has no constitutional authority in their
enabling acts or otherwise to reserve a right to modify or enact
statutes that will govern over court rules already in place.16
4
When a court promulgated rule conflicts with a legislative stat-
ute, the court's rule should prevail-regardless of whether the
statute was enacted subsequent to the rule. As stated in the
introduction, the legislature should not function as a separate
and conflicting procedure-making body. If, however, the legis-
lature does pass statutes in those areas not already governed
by a court promulgated rule, the court, as a matter of comity,
may let them stand.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's inherent power over the
legal profession provides an analogy. The court has permitted
statutes directed at attorneys to stand as a matter of comity so
long as they are not inconsistent with the court's control over
the profession. In Sharood v. Hatfield,16 5 the court explained the
following with regard to a legislative act intended to regulate
the practice of law:
It is true that this court has acquiesced in legislative acts
prescribing administrative procedures for admission and
discipline of attorneys as long as such acts did not usurp the
right of the court to make the final decision ....
We have no doubt but what some of the provisions of c.
638 as they apply to the judiciary were well motivated, and
164. For an example of such a statute, see MINN. STAT. § 480.058 (1986).
165. 296 Minn. 416, 210 N.W.2d 275 (1973).
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upon adequate consideration it is entirely possible that the
court may wish to adopt some of the provisions by rule of
the court. However, in so doing, we do not concede that
their enactment was a permissible legislative prerogative.1
66
Similar comity can properly be extended by the court to statu-
tory provisions on procedure that are not inconsistent with ex-
isting court rules. The inherent power over procedure would
be retained since the court is free at any time to override or
nullify inconsistent provisions.
Cases in other states that have considered the question of
which branch should govern in matters of procedure have uni-
formly held that absent contrary constitutional provisions the
judiciary's rule prevails.167 The Minnesota Supreme Court has
never ruled on the constitutionality of a court promulgated
rule that conflicts with a subsequently enacted procedural stat-
ute. Conflicts have occurred, but the disputes have been re-
solved on some basis other than the separation of powers. The
supreme court has given every indication, however, that its
rule will prevail if there is a conflict. 168 The situation involving
166. Id. at 424-25, 210 N.W.2d at 278-80.
167. See, e.g., Jennings v. State, 276 Ark. 217, 633 S.W.2d 373 (1982), cert. denied
459 U.S. 862 (1982); State v. Clemente, 166 Conn. 501, 353 A.2d 723 (1974); People
v. Cox, 82 Ill.2d 268, 412 N.E.2d 541 (1980); State v. Bridenhager, 257 Ind. 699, 279
N.E.2d 794 (1972); Newell v. State, 308 So.2d 71 (Miss. 1975); Winberry v. Salisbury,
5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950); Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting Inc., 89 N.M.
307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978) (discussed in Browde &
Occhialino, supra note 3.); State v. Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498, 527 P.2d 674 (1974).
The reason why there has not been a larger number of cases may be that the
terms of many of the state constitutions and statutes involved make litigation over the
question unlikely. The absence of appellate court cases in these states might also
indicate that conflicts between court rules and statutes do not occur frequently or,
when they do occur, are not deemed of sufficient import to result in litigation that
reaches the appellate courts.
168. The supreme court has been faced with the issue of conflicting statutes and
rules, but the problem was resolved on a basis other than the constitutional separa-
tion of powers. For example, State v. Keith, 325 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 1982), involved
a pretrial appeal from an order removing a county attorney from a gross misde-
meanor case and remanding it to the city attorney. The case was ultimately dismissed
by the court on the basis of the appellant's failure to timely file a brief, but the court
commented in dicta: "We note, however, that in matters of procedure rather than
substance the Rules of Criminal Procedure take precedence over statutes to the ex-
tent that there is any inconsistency." Id. at 642.
State v. Keith was used to support a later decision in State v. Cermak, 350
N.W.2d 328 (Minn. 1984). In Cermak, Rule 24.03 of the MINN. R. CRIM. P. was in
conflict with MINN. STAT. § 542.16 on the proper remedy to pursue when a motion to
remove a trial judge has been denied. The supreme court noted that the "enabling
legislation for the rules of criminal procedure clearly provides that the rules govern
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the rule and statute on directed verdicts in the early 1970s is
an example. 169
In 1958, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided, in McCourtie
v. U.S. Steel Corp.,170 that it was prejudicial error for a trial court
to instruct a jury on the effect of answers to special verdict
questions. In 1971, the Minnesota Legislature amended a stat-
ute to require jury instruction andpermit comment by counsel on
the effect of the special verdict.' 7 ' This statute had been previ-
ously listed by the court in the appendix to the civil rules of
1952 as being superceded by the rules, but it had never been
repealed by the legislature. It was certainly the intention of the
legislature, however, that their 1971 amendment would govern
the procedure in trial courts. Nevertheless, the supreme court
responded in early 1973 by amending their rule so as to pro-
vide for instruction and permit argument, but only in cases of
comparative negligence.' 7 2 In addition, the supreme court
again declared the legislature's statute to be superceded in the
as to matters of procedure, notwithstanding a conflicting statute .... In matters of
procedure rather than of substance, the Rules of Criminal Procedure take prece-
dence over statutes to the extent there is any inconsistency. [citing State v. Keith]"
Id. at 331. The statute that was declared to be superceded in Cermak had been
amended by the legislature after the court adopted their rule. There was no mention
of this in the court's opinion. The court did explain, however, that it found no merit
in the appellant's argument that the statute should govern because it was not listed
by the court in the appendix to the rules as one that was superceded by the rules. Id.
See also State v. Lopez, 390 N.W.2d 306 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (statute was not en-
acted or amended subsequent to the rule, but the court followed the supreme court's
comments in Keith and Cermak and decided that the rule prevails over a conflicting
statute).
169. This conflict example is described in Note, Informing the Jury of the Effect of Its
Answers to Special Verdict Questions-The Minnesota Experience, 58 MINN. L. REV 903
(1974). The author of this note takes the opposite position and concludes that stat-
utes prevail over court rules in Minnesota. The author of the note relied on a pas-
sage in Pirsig, The Proposed Amendment of the Judiciary Article of the Minnesota Constitution,
40 MINN. L. REV. 815 (1956), for this conclusion. The more recent judicial and legis-
lative developments and our analysis support the position taken in the present paper.
170. 253 Minn. 501, 93 N.W.2d 552 (1958).
171. See 1971 Minn. Laws, ch. 715, sec. 1 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 546.14 (re-
pealed 1974, Minn. Laws, ch. 394, sec. 11)). The legislature's amendment read as
follows:
The court shall give to the jury such explanations and instructions concern-
ing the matters thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to
make its findings upon each issue, and the court shall explain to the jury the
legal conclusions which will follow from its findings, and counsel shall have
the right to comment thereon.
Id. (emphasis added).
172. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 49.01. The present rule has not been amended since
1973.
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appendix to the court rules. 173
The constitutional validity of the legislature's 1971 amend-
ment was never addressed by the supreme court. In at least
one instance, a trial judge followed the procedure of the legis-
lature, but by the time the case reached the supreme court on
appeal the court had already amended their rule. 174 The
supreme court explained:
Since this court has recently adopted amendments to its
Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically Rule 49.01, permitting
that which was done in this case, no purpose would be
served in commenting on the asserted invalidity of L. 1971,
c. 715. Further, no purpose would be served in remanding
the matter for trial in accordance with our newly adopted
rule since the case was tried upon the exact procedures now
permitted by our rule. 1
75
In 1974, the legislature repealed the statute and the conflict no
longer exists with the court's rule.
The approach taken by the court in the case described above
illustrates a number of points. First, the court as a matter of
comity respects and acknowledges the actions of the legislative
branch; they reacted to the statutory amendment and reconsid-
ered their rule (albeit with a slightly different outcome than the
statute). Second, the court reasserted that their rule is to pre-
vail by again listing the statute in the appendix as being
superceded by the rule. And third, this case illustrates the in-
evitable fact that the legislature will continue to enact statutes
which to some extent deal with court procedure.
These attempts by the legislature to amend court procedural
rules negatively affect the administration of justice by creating
unnecessary confusion and leaving the court's rules in a prob-
lematic state. For example, there are sometimes two differing,
but seemingly legitimate, statutes and rules in effect on the
same subject. Lawyers, trial judges and others are then put in
the predicament of having to decide whether or not these stat-
utes have any validity. 176 The existence of a substantial
173. See MINN. R. Civ. P., Appendix B(I) & B(2). The court's appendix explicitly
states that MINN. STAT. § 546.14 (Laws 1971, Ch. 715) is superceded.
174. See Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 200, 203 N.W.2d
841 (1973).
175. Id. at 211, 203 N.W.2d at 848.
176. For example, if a defendant is charged with a misdemeanor in Minnesota, he
or she is entitled to ajury trial and, if indigent, to court appointed counsel. There is
a process, however, that allows the prosecutor to "certify" the offense as a petty mis-
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number of such statutes defeats one of the purposes of the
court rulemaking process: to permit judges, lawyers and others
to look to a single source for the procedural requirements of
litigation. The court also does not have any control over the
frequency of legislative alterations. The legislature sometimes
has a whimsical approach to court procedure: changing the
rules each session and creating more confusion. The legisla-
ture loses sight of the balance that must be met with regard to
the need for revision and the desire for consistency of
practice. 177
2. The Extent of the Court's Power
A cooperative relationship should also exist between the
court and the legislature on the question of the extent to which
the court can promulgate rules. The broad line to be drawn is
between substantive and procedural provisions: matters of
substantive law are part of the legislature's domain and proce-
dural provisions are the judiciary's. The distinction between
these two areas, however, is not clear.
demeanor. In such a case, the state is relieved of the burden of providing a jury trial
and counsel to the defendant. The defendant, in turn, receives a lesser charge and is
relieved of the threat of incarceration. See R. FRASE, P. HAUGEN, M. COSTELLO, MIN-
NESOTA MISDEMEANORS AND MOVING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS 11-0 (1988) for a complete
explanation. The court rule, promulgated in 1975, regarding the process for certify-
ing an offense as a petty misdemeanor is in conflict with a 1987 statute. The court
rule provides for three steps: (1) the prosecuting attorney must certify to the court
that in his opinion it is in the interests ofjustice that the defendant not be incarcer-
ated if convicted; (2) the defendant consents to the certification; and (3) the court
approves. MINN. R. CRIM. PRO. 23.04 (1988). The statute is similar, but declares:
"The defendant's consent to the certification is not required." MINN. STAT.
§ 609.131, subd. 1 (1988 supp.). Conflicts such as these-where the legislature has
recently enacted a statute in spite of the supreme court's rule-are potential cases for
raising the constitutional question of which rule should prevail.
177. Former Associate Justice George Scott described an example of this
problem:
Under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.02, subd. 1, the trial court "has discretion in
ordering presentence investigations."... Rule 27.02, subd. 1, superseded
Minn. Stat. § 609.115, subd. 1 (1974), which also provided that presentence
investigations were discretionary. In 1978 the legislature amended
§ 609.115 in order to make presentence investigations mandatory in felony
cases.... In 1979 the legislature amended § 609.115 to make presentence
investigations discretionary in misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor
cases.... In 1981 the legislature once again amended § 609.115, this time
making presentence investigations discretionary in all cases .... These con-
stant changes created much confusion, while Rule 27.02, subd. 1, remained
the same throughout the same time period.
Scott, Rules Changes in Minnesota: How the Rule Making Process Works, 18th CRIMINAL
JUSTICE INSTITUTE 491, 495-96 (1983).
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A frequent statement of the distinction is that the defining of
rights, duties and privileges are matters of substantive law
while the means by which these are enforced are matters of
procedural law. 178 In the view of former Minnesota Supreme
Court Justice George Scott, when a specific measure can rea-
sonably be viewed as either substantive or procedural, it
should be resolved in favor of its substantive character. He
states:
Due respect for the coequal branches of government re-
quires the court to exercise great restraint before striking
down a statute as unconstitutional, particularly when it in-
volves a determination of what is a legislative and what is a
judicial function. Sharood v. Hatfield, 296 Minn. 416, 423,
210 N.W.2d 275, 279 (1973).
The statute involved in this case in no way interferes with
the judiciary's function of ascertaining facts and applying
the law to the facts established. It merely provides a
method for enhancing the likelihood that a jury will not im-
permissibly speculate as to the reason no test results are of-
fered in prosecutions under § 169.121. As a matter of
comity we will enforce this statute, since it neither interferes
with nor impairs a judicial function.'
79
III. THE PROCESS OF RULEMAKING BY THE MINNESOTA
SUPREME COURT
The process by which the Minnesota Supreme Court con-
ducts rulemaking is not unlike the legislative process of enact-
ing statutes. It is also similar to the rulemaking methods of
many other states and resembles the rulemaking procedures
178. Substantive law "creates, defines, and regulates primary rights. In contrast,
practice and procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts
by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are effectuated." State v. Smith, 84
Wash. 2d 498, 501, 527 P.2d 674, 677 (1974).
The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that the question of who shall have a
privilege against compulsory disclosure of confidential information is one of proce-
dure for the court and, hence, was not available for legislative determination. Am-
merman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978) (discussed in Browde & Occhialino, supra note 3). This
privilege is a particularly sensitive public issue and, even if the determination is pro-
cedural in character, might appropriately have been left to the legislature as a matter
of comity. "It is generally acknowledged that many rules of evidence impinge di-
rectly and indirectly on substantive rights. Privileges are one obvious area." WEIN-
STEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 73 (1977).
179. State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 1983).
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followed by administrative agencies in Minnesota. This pro-
cess includes the various aspects of committee work; a prior
notice to the legal profession of changes that are being consid-
ered; the publication of the committee's proposed amend-
ments to the rules; a period of time for public comment; an
open hearing before the supreme court; and notice and publi-
cation of the rules when finally adopted by the court. Each of
these stages is described in more detail below.18 0
The process of rulemaking by the Minnesota Supreme Court
varies slightly according to the type of change being proposed
and the area of rules under consideration. For instance, the
supreme court itself on occasion initiates thorough reforms in
an entire set of rules. This type of renovation has occurred
once in the area of appellate procedure,' 8 ' every few years in
the area of civil procedure182 and is presently being completed
with the rules of evidence.' 8 3 Comprehensive changes such as
these allow the court to re-evaluate the rules overall-judging
them for their efficiency, effectiveness and fairness. These
changes also allow the court to examine recent amendments to
the federal rules and consider whether or not to change the
Minnesota rules so as to conform.
Rule amendments that are smaller in scope are often initi-
ated by persons or groups outside the court. For example, if a
person or group desires a change in procedures or believes
there is a problem with a rule, they ordinarily write to the
supreme court and petition for an amendment. Such letters or
petitions are received from a wide variety of sources, including
180. There is no single source that describes the Minnesota rulemaking process in
detail. The Minnesota Supreme Court apparently has only one written internal pro-
cedure regarding rulemaking. This was issued in 1974 and titled "Notice of Promul-
gation Filing and Record." See 9 MINN. STAT. xvi-xvii (1986) (court's notice is
reprinted in this source). This notice is limited to an explanation of the process the
court uses to notify the legal community when rules are adopted or when an open
hearing is to be held to discuss rule changes. Other sources provide only a summary
description of rulemaking in Minnesota. See D. PUGH, C. KORBAKES, J. ALFINI & C.
GRAU, JUDICIAL RULEMAKING: A COMPENDIUM 120-24 (1984); 9 MINN. STAT. XV
(1986); A. SODERBERG & B. GOLDEN, MINNESOTA LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDE § 441
(1985). There are also older, slightly out-dated accounts of Minnesota's rulemaking
process. See C. KORBAKES, J. ALFINI & C. GRAU, JUDICIAL RULEMAKING IN THE STATE
COURTS: A COMPENDIUM 102-05 (1978); andJ. PARNESS & C. KORBAKES, A STUDY OF
THE PROCEDURAL RULE-MAKING POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (1973).
181. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
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attorneys, judges, bar association groups and law profes-
sors. 8 4 When these letters or petitions are received by the
court, they are forwarded to the chairperson of the supreme
court advisory committee for those rules.8 5
There is a supreme court advisory committee for each area
of procedural rules. Committees have ranged in size from
twelve to eighteen people and consist of members of the bar,
academia and the bench.' 8 6 Committee members are not paid
for their work; their time and efforts are volunteered. The
court seems to maintain a representational fairness in its mem-
bership on the committees: committees include members from
the greater Minnesota area and the different backgrounds of
all members represent a wide variety of interests. 8 7 The chief
justice also appoints a member of the court to serve as a liaison
184. The supreme court maintains a file for each of the advisory committees on
rules of procedure. These files contain all of such records, including letters, petitions
and court orders.
It is interesting to note that the enabling acts of the Minnesota Legislature re-
quire the supreme court to act on any petition filed by a bar association or a judicial
organization. For example, the enabling act for rules of evidence provides: "The
Minnesota state bar association, or a professional judicial organization may file with
the court a petition specifying their suggestions concerning any existing or proposed
rule and requesting a hearing thereon. The court shall thereupon grant a hearing
thereon within six months after the filing of the petition." MINN. STAT. § 480.0591,
subd. 4 (1986). The enabling act for criminal procedure is identical and the act for
civil procedural rules is similar to the above. See MINN. STAT. §§ 480.059, subd. 4,
480.054 (1986). The enabling acts for juvenile procedure and appellate procedure
do not contain any such provision. See MINN. STAT. §§ 480.0595, 480A. 11 (1986).
185. There is no standard procedure for receiving proposed amendments in writ-
ten form. Some are sent directly to the court and others, by court order, are sup-
posed to be sent directly to the chair of the committee. For example, a few years ago
a court order regarding civil procedure provided: "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that
the Advisory Committee continue to serve to monitor said rules and amendments
and to hear and accept comments for further changes to be submitted to the Court
from time to time, and that such proposed amendments be directed in written form
to the chairman of the Advisory Committee .. " Amended Order Amending Minne-
sota Rules of Civil Procedure, March 21, 1985, repqinted in MINN. REP. 364-366
N.W.2d xxxi (1985).
186. There is no readily accessible reference for locating the membership of the
committees. The names of some members are printed in MINNESOTA RULES OF
COURT (1988) (West Publishing's "Desk Copy"). The names of other members can
be obtained by contacting the court administrator's office. Volume nine of MINNE-
SOTA STATUTES lists only an advisory committee "contact person." This person is not
a member of any advisory committee.
187. For example, the Advisory Committee on Probate Rules included ten mem-
bers from the non-metro area representing regions such as Alexandria, Aitkin, War-
ren, Center City and St. Cloud. See Membership List of the Minnesota Supreme
Court Advisory Committee on Probate Rules (copy on file at the court administra-
tor's office). Also consider the interests represented on the Advisory Committee on
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to each committee.188
There is no definite term or uniformly prescribed length of
stay for members on the committees. By order of the court,
some of the advisory committees are appointed each time the
rules need revision. For example, the first advisory committee
appointed by the court to study and recommend rules of evi-
dence disbanded after their work was completed. The chief
justice of the supreme court recently "re-instituted" the com-
mittee to consider changes to the rules. 189 Other committees
have remained intact, with most of the original members, since
they were first appointed by the court. For example, the
Supreme Court Advisory Committee for Rules of Criminal
Procedure has been in existence with the same members (ex-
cept for two replacements) since its inception in 1971.190
The frequency of advisory committee meetings depends en-
tirely on the amount of work that needs to be completed.
When a committee is formulating a new set of rules or consid-
ering comprehensive reforms, meetings are usually quite fre-
quent, often weekly. At other times, the usual work of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure: the Committee is composed of defense attorneys, pros-
ecutors and judges-three of the main groups interested in criminal procedure.
There have been complaints, however, about the representation on the Advisory
Committee for Criminal Rules. For example, in a 1975 brief to the court, before the
rules were adopted, the Minnesota Public Defenders Association maintained the
following:
It is appropriate to note that the Committee contained no public defender
practicing at the Municipal, County or District Court trial level, no defense
lawyer (public or private) from St. Paul or Ramsey County, Duluth or St.
Louis County, Rochester or Olmstead County; no prosecutor from any of
these cities or counties; no judge, Municipal or District, from Ramsey or
Olmstead Counties; indeed, while fully half of the Committee was from Min-
neapolis, the other major population centers of this State had no prosecutor
or defense lawyer, public or private, upon the Committee at all; the only
defense lawyers were from Minneapolis, and none of them a trial-level pub-
lic defender.
Brief of Minnesota Public Defenders Association in Opposition to Adoption of the
Rules at 4 (Jan. 21, 1975) (emphasis in original) (copy on file at the Minnesota
Supreme Court).
188. The present liaisons to the committees are as follows: Associate Justice Peter
S. Popovich, Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure; Associate Justice
Lawrence R. Yetka, Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence; Chief justice
Douglas K. Amdahl, Advisory Committee on Probate Rules; Associate Justice M.
Jeanne Coyne, Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure and the Advisory
Committee on Family Court Procedure; Justice Coyne also chairs the Advisory Com-
mittee on Appellate Procedure.
189. See supra note 131.
190. See also infra note 243 and accompanying text.
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committee does not require nearly as much time.' 9' There is
no public notice of when or where these meetings will be held,
however, and their location and accessibility to the public var-
ies. Again, the difference usually depends on the type of
changes being considered. Meetings are usually held in the
conference room of a law firm or in a judicial conference room.
Occasionally, meetings are held at places more accessible to
the public-such as law schools-but this is generally the case
only when a new set of rules is being formulated or when ma-
jor reforms are being considered. 192 There is also some differ-
ence of opinion between the chairpeople with regard to
whether non-members will be admitted into the committee
meetings. Some of the chairpeople are very open to the idea
of non-members attending; 93 other chairpeople prefer to
meet in private. 1
94
The advisory committees do not have any written proce-
dures that govern the process of their work. They apparently
do not vary much, however, in the manner in which they con-
sider changes to the rules. After research, often completed
with the assistance of a reporter, and discussion by members,
the usual method of deciding whether or not to recommend a
rule amendment to the court is by vote. Therefore, if a major-
ity of the committee members are in agreement on a proposal,
a recommendation is made to the court that the rule be
changed. Occasionally, minority reports are also filed with the
court if some members of the committee disagree with the ma-
jority's proposal. 195
191. For example, when the advisory committee for the rules of Family Court Pro-
cedure was first formulating its rules, the members met every other Friday, from
noon until 6:00 or 8:00 p.m., during a six month period in 1986. Since those rules
were adopted by the court, the committee has not had occasion for a meeting. Tele-
phone interview with the Honorable Eugene Kubes, Chairman of the Minnesota
Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Uniform Rules of Family Court Procedure
(Sept. 23, 1988).
192. For example, the advisory committee for the rules of evidence are presently
holding their monthly meetings at the Hamline Law School. Telephone interview
with Dean Peter Thompson, Chairman of the Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory
Committee on Rules of Evidence (Sept. 23, 1988). In addition, the Advisory Com-
mittee on Rules of Appellate Procedure held at least some meetings at the William
Mitchell College of Law when they considered reforms to the rules in 1983.
193. Telephone interview with James L. Hetland, Jr., Chairman of the Minnesota
Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Civil Procedure (Sept. 15, 1988).
194. Telephone interview with Frank Claybourne, Chairman of the Minnesota
Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sept. 8, 1988).
195. See, e.g., Minority Proposed Amendment to Rule 26.01, MINN. REP. 364-366
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In those instances where the rule being considered is rela-
tively important or controversial the court usually gives the
committee some direction beforehand or at least informs the
committee members where they should focus their investiga-
tion and time.' 96 The justice who serves as a liaison to the
committee is a frequent participant in the committee discus-
sion, but he or she does not speak for the court. Generally, the
committee meetings are not recorded on tape. 197 At least one
person, however, at each of the meetings takes minutes or
notes of the proceedings and discussion. These minutes and
notes are kept by the committee and are not on file with the
supreme court. 19
8
The importance of the supreme court advisory committees
should not be underestimated: their role and influence is very
similar to the committees of the legislature. The supreme
court's advisory committees complete all of the preliminary
work for the court, including research and drafting the pro-
posed rules. Because of the committee's vital function, the
court ordinarily defers to the advice of the committee mem-
bers and the rules eventually adopted by the court are usually
in the form recommended by the committee. When the court
does differ, it is usually in those instances where the rule being
considered is relatively important or controversial. The com-
mittee members also carefully prepare comments that are pub-
lished with the proposed rules. These comments are not
binding on courts interpreting the rules, but they are influen-
tial in that they explain the intentions of the committee when
drafting the rule.199
After the committee has reported its findings and recom-
N.W.2d lxiii (1984) (regarding discovery practice and filed by six members of the
Advisory Committee for Rules of Civil Procedure).
196. Interview with James L. Hetland, Jr., supra note 193.
197. There is a least one exception: the advisory committee for rules of appellate
procedure recorded some of their meetings in 1983.
198. It is likely that the public has access to these committee minutes or notes
under the supreme court's recently adopted Rules of Public Access to Records of the
Judicial Branch. See MINNESOTA RULES OF COURT at 755 (1988).
It should be noted that the authors found the court and staff very helpful in
researching this article and all of the information in the committee files kept by the
court are apparently open to the public.
199. The non-binding nature of the committee comments is often noted in court
orders adopting rules. For example, ChiefJustice Robert Sheran commented as fol-
lows when adopting the rules of evidence: "The inclusion of the Advisory Committee
comments is made for convenience and does not necessarily reflect court approval of
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mendations, the court announces to the public that changes to
the rules are being considered. An internal order of the court,
titled "Notice of Promulgation Filing and Record," requires
that a public notice be made announcing that the court is con-
sidering changes to the rules. This notice announces the date
and time for an open hearing to discuss the amendments; ex-
plains where written statements concerning the amendments
will be received; explains that people wanting to make an oral
presentation should give notice to the court by a certain date;
and gives instructions for obtaining copies of the proposed
rules. 200 This notice is published in the Supreme Court edi-
tion of Finance and Commerce and the St. Paul Legal Ledger. These
publications are officially designated as media for notices of
the court. The proposed changes to the rules are ordinarily
printed in the introductory material of the Northwestern Reporter
2d Advance Sheets, West Publishing Company's Minnesota Ses-
sion Law Service and the monthly periodical Bench and Bar of
Minnesota.20 In addition, copies are kept in the Office of the
Court Administrator.
Attendance at the open hearings naturally varies with the
rule being considered. If it is important or controversial, a
number of witnesses usually appear to testify. 20 2 During the
the comments." Order Promulgating the Rules of Evidence, April 1, 1977, reprinted
in MINNESOTA RULES OF COURT at 322 (1988).
200. See Supreme Court Rules: Notice of Promulgation Filing and Record (re-
printed at 9 MINN. STAT. xvi (1986)). See also A. SODERBERG & B. GOLDEN, MINNESOTA
LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDE § 441 (1985).
201. West Publishing Company prints a sort of disclaimer note in the Advance
Sheets with each court order, notice and copy of proposed rules: "NOTICE: Court
rules and related materials supplied by the courts are included. Since all rules and
amendments may not have been supplied, the clerk of the appropriate court should
be consulted to determine the current rules."
202. The controversial nature of a change, however, does not always determine
the degree of participation in the open hearing. For example, the Minnesota
Supreme Court recently held a hearing to consider changes to the rules of civil pro-
cedure regarding Minnesota's long standing practice of commencing a civil action by
service of the complaint. The Advisory Committee members were evenly split on
whether the rule should be amended so as to conform with the federal rule (the
federal rule requires filing a complaint with the court for commencement of an ac-
tion). As a result, no official recommendation was made to the court. Despite the
important issues raised, there were relatively few participants in the hearing: "At-
tendance at the hearing was surprisingly light. Only four individuals other than the
advisory committee representatives made oral presentations and observers in the gal-
lery numbered no more than a dozen. Written communications filed with the Court
in advance of the hearing numbered 16." Rule 3 Debate Dominates Civil Rules Hearing,
MSBA In Brief, July 1988, at 5, col. 4.
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hearing, the people giving testimony are often questioned by
members of the court-in much the same way that appellate
oral arguments are conducted. These open hearings are re-
corded and the tapes are kept on file at the court.
Following the open hearing, the members of the court dis-
cuss in private conference the proposed changes to the rules.
The liaison justice to the rules committee usually introduces
the subject and leads the discussion. The justices then decide
by majority vote whether to adopt or reject the proposed
amendment.203 If a procedural rule is adopted or amended by
the court, it is printed in the Northwestern Reporter 2d Advance
Sheets and eventually in the hardbound Minnesota Reporter.
20 4
All of the court's rules are also eventually published in volume
nine of the Minnesota Statutes, updated annually, and in Minne-
sota Rules of Court, a reference pamphlet published each year by
West Publishing Company.
IV. CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR EFFECTIVE RULEMAKING
When a state appellate court has the constitutionally exclu-
sive authority to promulgate rules of procedure, certain obliga-
tions and expectations appear to be warranted.
(1) The court, and it alone, should have the responsibility
for the procedures that will govern litigation. The objective
should be to make litigation as simple and as inexpensive as
the requirements of a fair and prompt trial permit. Litigation
necessarily is conducted by lawyers and judges; their exper-
iences and views, expressed through their organizations and
otherwise, should be considered in the course of the rulemak-
ing process.
(2) Since the court ordinarily cannot itself engage in the
often arduous task of preparing the necessary rules, it must de-
pend on others. The court should appoint committees to pre-
pare and submit recommended rules, following the example
set by the United States Supreme Court.
203. The internal method of the supreme court for deciding rules of procedure is
quite similar to the usual method of case disposition. See the newly adopted Case
Dispositional Procedures of the Supreme Court, Oct. 19, 1988, reprinted in 429
NORTHWESTERN REPORTER 2D Advance Sheets, No. 3, at liv.
204. Most of the court's orders regarding procedures, advisory committees and
other matters are also reprinted in the introductory materials of the MINNESOTA RE-
PORTER. But see supra note 201. The MINNESOTA REPORTER is a set of condensed
volumes that contain only the Minnesota cases from the NORTHWESTERN REPORTER.
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(3) The quality of the recommendations will depend on the
ability and commitment of those appointed to the committees.
The membership should consist of able experienced practi-
tioners, qualified in the field at hand, and include judges, law
professors and lay persons whose activities have given them
some understanding of the judicial system. Qualified women
and minority persons should not be excluded. Geographical
representation should also be a factor in the court's considera-
tion of appointments. Legislative attempts to designate who
may or may not be appointed as members of the committees
appears clearly beyond the authority of the legislature. The
court must have the power to designate those who will provide
it with the necessary assistance. 205
(4) Members should be appointed for limited and staggered
terms so that there is a steady input of new members with fresh
approaches and that there be public confidence in the currency
of the committees. Staggering terms would also help to pro-
vide the committee with the proper degree of continuity and
change.20 6 Following the restructuring of the United States
Supreme Court committees by Chief Justice Warren, a four-
year term, renewable for an additional four years, appears to
be the general policy of the Court.
20 7
205. The Minnesota Legislature has enacted the following statutes designating the
composition of the advisory committees: MINN. STAT. § 480.052 (1986); MINN. STAT.
§ 480.059, subd. 2 (1986); and MINN. STAT. § 480.0591, subd. 2 (1986).
206. Consider the following staggered terms required by the Minnesota Supreme
Court's committees for professional rules: RULES OF BOARD ON JUDICIAL STANDARDS
1 (b)(2) (no more than two full four-year terms); RULES ON LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 4(a)(2) (no more than two three-year terms); RULES OF LAWYER
TRUST ACCOUNT BOARD 1 (no more than two three-year terms); MINN. RULES FOR
ADMISSION TO THE BAR IA (staggered three-year terms); RULES OF THE SUP. CT. FOR
CoNT. LEGAL EDUCATION 2 (staggered three-year terms and no more than two terms);
PLAN FOR THE MINN. STATE BOARD OF LEGAL CERTIFICATION 2.03 (staggered three-
year terms and no more than two terms); RULES OF THE MINN. CLIENT SECURITY
BOARD 1.02 (staggered three terms and no more than two consecutive terms).
207. It may be unwise, in some circumstances, for a court to impose maximum
terms of service on present committee members. For example, the Minnesota
Supreme Court Advisory Committee for Rules of Criminal Procedure was appointed
in 1971. Ten of the twelve originally appointed members remain on the Committee
at the present writing. The Committee is currently engaged in examining the re-
cently promulgated Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, which, to a large extent,
implement the 1980 Second Edition of the American Bar Association's Criminal Jus-
tice Standards. The Committee is considering which, if any, of these Rules should be
recommended to the Minnesota Supreme Court. In these circumstances, to replace
those members who have already served maximum terms would, in effect, create a
new committee and be disruptive of the progress already made. Similar disruptions
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(5) The court should provide a general sense of direction to
each committee. For example, in 1971, ChiefJustice Knutson
of the Minnesota Supreme Court, on appointing the present
committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, informed it that it
should examine the then existing American Bar Association
Standards of Criminal Justice with a view to their
implementation 208
(6) The public and particularly those individuals who have a
substantial interest in the rules being drafted should know and
have access to the committee members. 209
(7) Interested and concerned persons and organizations
should be notified when important rule proposals or rule
changes are being considered. Proposed rules and notices of
committee meetings should be sent to all appropriate publica-
tions. The court should request that these rules and notices be
made available to the publication's subscribers. 2 10
(8) Interested and concerned persons and organizations
should be given the opportunity to be heard at committee
meetings when important rule proposals or rule changes are
being considered. (Allowing public participation at the com-
mittee level would of course require that committee meetings
be held at places accessible to the public.) The opportunity of
an open hearing before the court, after the advisory committee
has submitted its recommendations, is not sufficient. The time
allotted to each participant is of necessity limited. In addition
may occur when a committee member's term expires in the course of a project in
which his or her contribution is so indispensable that the membership should be
continued until the project is completed.
208. Consider the order of ChiefJustice Hughes on appointing the first Advisory
Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "It shall be the duty of the Advisory
Committee, subject to the instructions of the Court, to prepare and submit to the Court a
draft of a unified system of rules .... 21 A.B.A.JouR. 398 (1935) (emphasis added).
Pirsig: Another example comes to mind. When Chief Justice Earl Warren first
met with the then recently appointed Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, he indicated that it was not his intention that the committee should engage in
major revisions in the then current Rules of Criminal Procedure.
209. In Minnesota, for example, the names of all the committee members should
be published in West Publishing Company's annual pamphlet titled MINNESOTA.
RULES OF COURT. The committees, the members, their business addresses and tele-
phone numbers should also be published in the annual bar directory issue of BENCH
AND BAR OF MINNESOTA.
210. Some periodicals would obviously not be able to print an extensive set of
proposed rules. However, there is no method in place at the present for notification
of Advisory Committee meetings in Minnesota. See supra note 192 and accompanying
text.
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to oral presentations, there are usually letters, written state-
ments and documents presented to the court. The committee,
however, may not have had sufficient prior opportunity to ex-
amine and consider the relevance and merits of the informa-
tion so presented. In any event, having submitted its
recommendations to the court, the committee is now likely to
be less inclined to take an objective view of criticisms raised to
the recommended rules.
Giving an opportunity to be heard at the committee level to
those who have their own recommendations to offer or want to
object to the committee's proposed rules leads to better com-
mittee recommendations, more effective court hearings, better
court rules, and more general satisfaction with those rules and
the process by which they were developed and promulgated. 21'
Critics of this method of open meetings would likely object on
the grounds that the presence of non-members would inhibit
discussion and the exploration of ideas. This legitimate con-
cern could be resolved, however, by allowing the committee to
go in executive session after receiving public testimony.
(9) The court should publish procedures to govern the
rulemaking process. There are a number of areas that require
consistent and uniform treatment, particularly with regard to
the proceedings of the advisory committees. If published with
other court rules, these procedures would also promote public
awareness, participation and approval in the rulemaking
process.
(10) The court should publish an appendix with each set of
promulgated rules that lists the statutes superceded by those
rules. 21 2 The list should be kept current and published annu-
ally. Researching and compiling these appendices would re-
quire considerable effort, but practitioners and judges would
not be left in doubt over which statutes the court has accepted
in the interests of comity and which have been superceded by
court rule.2 13
211. See generally WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES (1977);
Wright, Book Review, 9 ST. MARY'S L. JOUR. 652 (1978) (reviewing Weinstein's book);
Parness & Manthey, Public Process in State Court Rulemaking, 63 JUDICATURE 338 (1980).
212. The Minnesota Supreme Court publishes such lists as appendices to the rules
of Civil Procedure and Criminal Procedure. The first version of the Rules of Civil
Appellate Procedure in the sixties also containted such a list.
213. For an example of a Minnesota criminal procedural rule that is in conflict
with a recent statute, but not listed in the court's appendix, see supra note 176.
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V. THE ORDER OF FINAL ARGUMENTS: AN EXAMPLE OF THE
PROBLEMS WITH COURT PROCEDURE BY THE
LEGISLATURE
The topic of which branch of government should possess the
power to ultimately prescribe the procedures governing court
proceedings raises many points of policy. The question
presented is, Which branch of government is better able to pre-
scribe those procedures-the legislature or the courts? There
are many logical reasons why the legislature should not be de-
termining court procedures and these policy considerations
have been a topic in many of the articles published on the
rulemaking power-including those dating back to Pound and
Wigmore. 2' 4 The logical disadvantages of the legislature and
the problems with Minnesota's present rulemaking system are
best illustrated in a recent controversy over the rule governing
the order in which final arguments are given in a criminal
trial.2 15
This section will describe that controversy and its policy im-
plications in three parts. The first part is historical: the order
of final argument has a long and controversial past and this
part describes some of the attempts over the past one hundred
years to change the procedure. The second part describes the
recent successful efforts of county and state attorneys to
change the court adopted rule to their favor through the legis-
lative process. 216 The third part briefly describes the hearing
214. See, e.g, Pound, Regulating Procedural Details by Rules of Court, 13 A.B.A. J. 12
(Supp. March 1927); Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Consti-
tutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276 (1928). See also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
Also consider the practical drawbacks to legislative statutes that are meant to
preempt duly adopted court rules. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
215. As one commentator has also explained:
[Tlhis controversy highlights the "little noticed but important constitutional
problem now lurking in the Minnesota legal system.... [It] raises the ques-
tion of whether the legislature or the Supreme Court has the authority to
promulgate or modify rules of court procedure and if there is a conflict be-
tween these two branches of government which prevails .... At first blush
this may appear to be a mundane matter of little interest but it highlights the
continuing tension between branches of government over the issue of which
has the final authority to determine and implement important matters of
public policy."
Bush, Court Rulemaking by the Legislature: Who Gets the Last Word?, MINNESOTA TRIAL
LAWYER 24 (Summer 1987).
216. Tietjen: In this section I have used taped legislative testimony extensively in
the footnotes to support our position that the legislature, for logical reasons, should
not be involved with court procedures. As a result, the footnotes are very lengthy in
places. We felt this was necessary, however, so that questions and comments of the
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of the Minnesota Supreme Court on the issue of whether to
modify the court promulgated rule so as to conform with the
legislature's statutory amendment.
A. A History of the Order of Final Arguments
In 1875, the Minnesota Legislature passed a statute estab-
lishing the order in which final arguments would be given in a
criminal trial: the prosecution was to go first and the defense
last. The reason the statute was passed with this order of argu-
ment is not clear, but it remained unchanged for over one hun-
dred years.2 17 Prosecutors, however, were never pleased with
the tradition. Over the course of time, they frequently at-
tempted to change the procedure to conform with many of the
other courts in the country-both state and federal-in which
the prosecution gives the first argument, the defense replies
and the prosecution has an opportunity for a rebuttal.
Indeed, the history of the order of final argument shows a
constant progression of attempts by Minnesota county attor-
neys to receive the right to a rebuttal. As early as 1922, in a
speech given at the opening session of Minnesota's Crime
Commission, Chief Justice Calvin Brown of the Minnesota
Supreme Court explained, "Repeated efforts have been made
to bring about a change in this state, but without success; the
legislature has declined to make it." 2 18 The Crime Commis-
sion Reports of 1927 and 1934 continued to recommend that
the prosecution be granted the right to a rebuttal, explaining
that the change had been urged by the legislative committee of
the Minnesota County Attorneys Association. 219 Floyd B. Ol-
son, former Governor of Minnesota and Hennepin County At-
legislators and of the people giving testimony are not taken out of context nor given
emphasis where none was intended by the speaker.
217. Minnesota, in fact, became the only state in the nation with this particular
order of argument. See Kunkel & Geis, Order of Final Argument in Minnesota Criminal
Trials, 42 MINN. L. REV. 549, 550 (1958). Kunkel and Geis also explained that though
Minnesota's order of final argument is unique to the United States, allowing the ac-
cused the last word is generally accepted in many European countries as basic "fair
play" and as an "essential safeguard." Id. at 549. Kunkel and Geis did not explain,
however, that there are many other states that allow the defense to speak first and the
prosecution last, with no opportunity for a rebuttal. See, e.g., MASS. R. CRIM. P.
§ 24(a)(1).
218. REPORT OF THE MINNESOTA CRIME COMMISSION 12 (1923).
219. REPORT OF THE MINNESOTA CRIME COMMISSION 34 (1927) and REPORT OF THE
MINNESOTA CRIME COMMISSION 47 (1934).
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torney, also advocated changing Minnesota's uncommon
procedure in his inaugural address of 1931.220
In the nineteen fifties, two researchers surveyed all the
county attorneys in Minnesota and one randomly selected at-
torney from each county to determine the support for Minne-
sota's unique order of final argument. 221 According to the
researchers, "The prosecutors and private attorneys split, as
might be expected, in their attitude toward the statute; each
group tending to support its particular interests." 222 They
found that only fourteen percent of the randomly selected at-
torneys were opposed to the order, while sixty percent of the
prosecutors surveyed were against the order of argument. 223
In the early 1970s, the supreme court's Advisory Committee
on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, while preparing a draft of
proposed rules for the court, devoted a great deal of time and
attention to the rule regarding the order of final argument.
The procedural rule eventually proposed by the court's advi-
sory committee in 1975 allowed the defense to argue first, the
prosecution to answer in reply, a five minute rebuttal by the
defense, and a five minute surrebuttal by the prosecution at the
discretion of the court.224 Before the court promulgated the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, briefs from both sides were sub-
220. Governor Olson said,
Minnesota, being the only state in the United States where counsel for the
defense has the closing argument to the jury, I recommend that the prose-
cuting attorney be given the right by law to reply briefly to the argument of
the counsel for the defense in conformity with the practice in the Federal
courts.
J. McGRATH &J. DELMONT, FLOYD B. OLSON: MINNESOTA'S GREATEST LIBERAL GOVER-
NOR 181 (1937). Immediately before becoming governor, Floyd B. Olson had spent
ten years as the Hennepin County Attorney. Id. at 26-30.
221. Kunkel & Geis, supra note 217, at 551.
222. Id.
223. Id. It wasn't entirely accurate, however, for Kunkel and Geis to claim that the
two groups supported their own interests since the randomly selected attorneys were
not necessarily criminal defense attorneys.
224. The proposed rule read as follows:
At the conclusion of the evidence, the defendant may make a closing argu-
ment to the jury.... The prosecution may make a closing argument to the
jury. The defendant shall then be permitted five minutes to reply in rebuttal
and shall raise in rebuttal no new issues of law or fact which were not
presented in one or both of the prior arguments. In the discretion of the
court the prosecution may be permitted five minutes to reply in rebuttal to
the rebuttal argument of the defendant, provided the defendant's rebuttal
was improper.
MINNESOTA PROPOSED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND COMMENTS 149 (1975).
The rule first circulated by the committee in 1973 read essentially the same as above,
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mitted to the justices and an open hearing was held to consider
the issue. 2
25
The proposed rule of final argument was vigorously debated
by prosecutors and defense attorneys. "No single facet of the
Rules evinced the intense emotional response as did the order
of final argument." 226 A memorandum from the Office of the
Attorney General declared:
It is undisputed that the order of closing arguments often
has a significant impact on the determination of juries in
criminal cases. The authorities are divided on the issue of
whether it is more advantageous to make the first or the last
argument to the jury. Some studies have indicated that in
the more complex cases, the best position is last, while it is
more advantageous to make the first closing argument in
cases with few and simple issues. In any event, the pro-
posed Minnesota rule would satisfy both Pangloss and crim-
inal defendants by giving them the "best of all possible
worlds." 2
27
The court eventually rejected the Advisory Committee's pro-
posal and left the order of final argument essentially the same
as the statute written one hundred years before: "The order of
a jury trial shall be substantially as follows: . . . At the conclu-
sion of the evidence, the prosecution may make a closing argu-
ment to the jury .... The defendant may then make a closing
argument to the jury .... The court shall charge the jury."228
Nevertheless, county and state attorneys continued to attempt
to convince the court to change the rule in their favor.
Since 1975, when the Rules of Criminal Procedure were
promulgated by the court, prosecutors have tried at least twice
but without a time limitation on the rebuttal. See MINNESOTA PROPOSED RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND COMMENTS 29 (1973).
225. See, e.g., Brief of Minnesota Public Defenders Association in Opposition to
Adoption of the Rules (January 21, 1975) and Memorandum of the Office of the
Attorney General in Opposition to a Proposed Rule of Criminal Procedure (January
28, 1975).
226. 2 H. MCCARR, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: MINNESOTA CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCE-
DURE § 942 (1976).
227. Memorandum of the Attorney General, supra note 225, at 3.
228. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03 sub. 11 (MINNESOTA RULES OF COURT (1986)). Ac-
cording to McCarr, the supreme court first countered the proposal of the committee
with a tentative amendment that would have allowed the prosecution to argue first,
the defense to reply and a five minute rebuttal by the prosecution. The alternative,
however, was "vigorously opposed by defense counsel" at the court's open hearing.
MCCARR, supra note 226, at 942.
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to change the order of final argument through the prescribed
method of the supreme court and its advisory committee.
229
They have also attempted to change the order of argument by
statute in the legislature. Each time, however, they failed to
convince the court or the legislature that changing the rule was
necessary. 230
Perhaps the most extraordinary feature of this criminal pro-
cedural rule was not the uniqueness of the order of argument,
but its perseverance. It is remarkable that such an eristical
rule, commonly perceived as favoring the criminal defendant,
could survive for so long and through so many changes in the
political climate.
23 '
B. The 1987 Session of the Legislature
In 1987, frustrated prosecutors finally bypassed the judicial
branch and convinced the legislature to amend a statute (the
modern version of the nineteenth century procedural statute)
so as to allow them a rebuttal in closing arguments.2 3 2 The
229. Attorney Phil Bush explained:
In 1975 the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the Minnesota Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Rule 26.03 subd. 11 conformed to Minnesota's long
standing order of closing argument despite intense efforts by the prosecu-
tion to change the order to prosecution, defense, prosecution. In 1977 and
1983 prosecutors again attempted to change the order of final argument so
that they could argue both first and last and the Supreme Court left the
order the same.
Bush, supra note 215, at 24. See also MCCARR, supra note 226, at §§ 942-943.
230. A bill was introduced in the Minnesota Senate in 1981 to change the order of
final argument. See Senate File No. 780, 72nd Legislature, 1st Sess. (1981). State
Senator Marv Hanson (DFL-Ist Dist.) was the principal author. The bill evidently
received little support and there was no companion bill introduced in the House.
The rule proposed to the court by the advisory committee in 1983 would have
created an order of final argument essentially identical to the order proposed in
1975. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. The prosecution again opposed
this order of argument. Among the memorandums filed on the subject in later years
is an extensive brief presented to the court in 1983 by Crow Wing County Attorney
Stephen Rathke. See Memorandum of the Crow Wing County Attorney, for the Min-
nesota County Attorneys Association, Proposing an Amendment to the Order of Fi-
nal Argument in Criminal Matters (filed February 8, 1983).
231. The issue of the order of final argument was also once raised on appeal. In
State v. Mitchell, 268 Minn. 513, 130 N.W.2d 128 (1964), cert. denied 380 U.S. 984
(1965), the Minnesota Supreme Court explained: "It does not seem to us that [Minn.
Stat.] § 631.07 presents an obstacle to the protection of the state's rights in a crimi-
nal trial .. " Id. at 518, 130 N.W.2d at 131.
232. One participant in the debate described this maneuver as follows:
The [issue] that I think is most troubling, or should be the most troubling
for this court, is the whole issue of separation of powers .... The problem
that we then have is exactly what Justice Yetka pointed out before: every
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original bill submitted to the legislature was written by the
Hennepin County Attorney's Office. 233 The bill proposed that
the statute be amended to grant the prosecution an absolute
right to a rebuttal after the defense attorney's argument, with
no opportunity for a surrebuttal by the defense. 234 The bill
provoked a flurry of opinions on the merits of the proposed
changes.235
time either side is annoyed, upset or concerned about a particular rule, they
have two avenues, like a child who plays their father first, "Can I go to the
prom?" and dad says, "No"; then they play the mother, "Can I go to the
prom?" and mom says, "No"; then they go back to dad again, "Well, mom
didn't quite say no, maybe she sort of said this," and then back to mom, and
back and forth it goes. And that is exactly what the prosecutors have been
doing over the last few years. They have essentially looked for anybody to
buy their argument, regardless of what procedures this court has carefully
established .... [T]hose procedures have been cast to the side for a very
small goal; and that small goal is the prosecutor's wish list on closing
argument.
Comments of Mr. Stephen Cooper at the Minnesota Supreme Court hearing to dis-
cuss proposed changes to the rules of criminal procedure, June 25, 1987 (tape on file
at the Minnesota Supreme Court).
233. Hennepin County Attorney Tom Johnson's proposal to the 1987 legislature
explained:
Clearly an amendment to Minnesota Statute 631.07 allowing the prosecutor
a rebuttal is long overdue. This rebuttal would not be an additional chance
to argue the case, but would simply allow the prosecution to address any
improprieties and inconsistencies suggested by the defense in order to avoid
an unjust acquittal based on a mistaken perception of the facts or a misun-
derstanding of the law. Minnesota should join the rest of the nation and
allow the prosecutor the opportunity for rebuttal in the order of closing
arguments.
Memorandum of the Office of the Hennepin County Attorney, Closing Argument:
Who Ought to Have the "Last Word" With the Jury? at 4 (1987) (unpublished mem-
orandum written by the Hennepin County Attorney's Office as part of their lobbying
effort for a rebuttal; copy on file at the office of the William Mitchell Law Review).
234. According to the county attorneys, "The underlying rationale is based on the
fact that the right to open and close is not governed by constitutional mandate, but is
simply a procedural consideration and, as such, should be given to the party with the
burden of proof according to the traditional rules of fairness." Id. at 1. The pro-
posed statute read:
When the giving of evidence is concluded in a criminal trial, unless the case
is submitted on either or both sides without argument, the prosecution may
make a closing argument to the juy. The defense may then make its closing argument to
the jury. The prosecution shall then be permitted to reply in rebuttal, limited to argument
which is responsive to defendant's closing argument.
Id. (emphasis in original). The bill eventually adopted by the legislature did not
grant an absolute right to a rebuttal. See infra note 268.
235. See, e.g., Don't Let Rule Change Tip Scales of Justice, St. Paul Pioneer Press and
Dispatch, Feb. 28, 1987, at 10A, col. 1 [hereinafter Editorial] (editorial in opposition
to the proposed rule changes).
In their original bill, the county attorneys also requested two other changes to
criminal procedures. One provision was to increase the number of jury selection
peremptory challenges so that county attorneys would have the same number of chal-
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The Hennepin County Attorney's Office obtained the chair-
men of the judiciary committees-in both the House and the
Senate-as authors of the bill. 23 6 They were a formidable pair,
for the bill was naturally referred to their committees for con-
sideration before discussion and vote by each house. There
were many allegations that legislators were pressured to pass
the county attorneys' bill and some suggested it was even
"greased" to pass. 237 There is no evidence, however, of any
political impropriety on the part of the sponsors of the legisla-
tion.238 But this case does serve as an example of the tremen-
lenges as defense attorneys. See Memorandum of the Office of the Hennepin County
Attorney, Selecting a Jury: A Question of "Tilt" (1987) (unpublished memorandum
written by the Hennepin County Attorney's Office as part of their lobbying efforts;
copy on file at the office of the William Mitchell Law Review). The other provision of
the bill was to give the prosecution a presumption in favor ofjoinder when multiple
defendants are charged with the same crime. The then existing rule provided that
defendants be tried separately unless the court found it to be in the interest ofjustice
to order a joint trial. See Memorandum of the Office of the Hennepin County Attor-
ney, Joinder: A Question of One or Several Trials (1987) (unpublished memoran-
dum written by the Hennepin County Attorney's Office as part of their lobbying
efforts; copy on file at the office of the William Mitchell Law Review).
The county attorneys found limited success with the joinder provision; the stat-
ute was amended to remove the presumption entirely from the statute. See MINN.
STAT. § 631.035 (1987 supp.). On the issue of the number of peremptory challenges,
no changes were made to the statute. See generally Bush, supra note 215.
236. The chairman of the House Judiciary Committee was Representative Randy
Kelly (DLF-Dist. 67A). THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 128 (1987-88). The
chairman of the SenateJudiciary Committee was Senator Allan Spear (DFL-Dist. 59).
Id. at 120.
237. During a session of the House Judiciary Committee, the chairman of the
committee, Randy Kelly, became very annoyed with a witness from the Hennepin
County Public Defender's Office when he learned that an internal memo written by
Hennepin County Public Defender William Kennedy described the bill as "greased."
See Remarks of Representative Randy Kelly (DFL-Dist. 67A) at the House Judiciary
Committee meeting, February 16, 1987 (tape on file at the Legislative Reference Li-
brary).
James Kaster, chairperson of the Criminal Law Section of the Minnesota State
Bar Association, commented at the rules hearing of the supreme court that, "if the
suggestion is being made . . .that this bill was not spearheaded by the Hennepin
County Attorney's Office and the County Attorneys Association, that suggestion is
inconsistent with the appearance that I received when I sat through these sessions."
Comments of Mr. James Kaster at the Minnesota Supreme Court hearing to discuss
propsed changes to the rules of criminal procedure, June 25, 1987 (tape on file at the
Minnesota Supreme Court).
238. Many witnesses both in favor of and opposed to the bill appeared before the
House and Senate committees. Indeed, there were quite a number of representative
from the legal community testifying. Among them were Associate Justice George
Scott of the Minnesota Supreme Court (since retired from the court); Professor May-
nard E. Pirsig of the William Mitchell College of Law; Professor C. Peter Erlinder of
the William Mitchell College of Law; Hennepin County Attorney, Tom Johnson;
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dous political force that can be asserted in the legislature. The
state and county attorneys were able to create a powerful lob-
bying force to promote their bill. In addition to the Minnesota
County Attorneys Association, this bill also had the support of
law enforcement and victim's rights organizations. 23 9 There
were a number of opponents to the bill who testified, but their
political clout was probably not comparable to the proponents;
defense attorneys are not elected officials and they do not have
a significant lobbying force.
240
Testimony was heard in the legislature on the issue of the
separation of powers and the source and scope of the rulemak-
ing authority. One of the most important commentators on
this issue was Associate Justice George Scott of the Minnesota
Supreme Court. He testified at a Senate subcommittee hear-
ing at the invitation of a legislator and as a representative of
the court. He suggested to the legislators that their actions
were a violation of the separation of powers. Justice Scott said,
"The court has always understood that procedure was an in-
herent right of the judicial branch of government, procedure
meaning the difference from substance."
24'
When the proponents of the bill were asked why they were
turning to the legislature rather than the court for rulemaking,
there were a few different replies. Hennepin County Attorney
Tom Johnson claimed that the legislature has a more "height-
ened awareness" of the public's concern for the unequal bal-
ance of the judicial system in favor of the defendant. He also
claimed that there is an increased need for a rebuttal because
Crow Wing County Attorney, Stephen Rathke; Assistant U.S. Attorney, Tom Hefelf-
inger; private attorney, Ronald Meshbesher; and Director of the Neighborhood Jus-
tice Center in St. Paul, Stephen Cooper (since appointed Commissioner of
Minnesota Department of Human Rights).
239. This support was also commented on by Hennepin County Attorney Tom
Johnson. See Remarks of Tom Johnson during the Senate Criminal Law Division
meeting, April 21, 1987 (tape on file at the Legislative Reference Library). See also
supra note 237 and infra notes 245 and 267.
240. This point was apparently recognized by some legislators in the next legisla-
tive session. A bill was passed to create a position for a lobbyist who would work on
behalf of criminal defense interests. The act passed by the legislature says, in part,
"The new position shall include in its duties the provision of counsel on legislative
proposals during legislative sessions." 1988 Minn. Laws, ch. 686, art. 1, sec. 4.
241. Remarks of Justice George Scott during the Senate Criminal Law Division
meeting, April 21, 1987 (tape on file at the Legislative Reference Library). The co-
author of this article, Professor Maynard E. Pirsig, also testified on this point of the
separation of powers.
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of the rising crime rate and corresponding number of crime
victims.242 The supreme court was evidently unaware of this
need. Crow Wing County Attorney Stephen Rathke claimed
that the supreme court's Advisory Committee on Rules of
Criminal Procedure is biased in favor of defense interests and,
as a result, it was necessary for prosecutors to resort to the
legislature for the amendment. Rathke said, "The same peo-
ple that were appointed in 1971, are still on the rules commit-
tee, except for two judges, one who died and one who retired,
who have been replaced by defense attorneys, by the way."
243
242. Consider the following exchange between Representative Kathleen Vellenga
(DFL-Dist. 64A) and County Attorney Tom Johnson:
VELLENGA: I would like to ask Mr. Johnson a couple of questions please,
Tom? I'm sorry if I missed it in your remarks, did you state to the commit-
tee why this proposal did not pass the supreme court rules and why it should
be taken out of the supreme court's rule-making and put into the statutes
instead?
JOHNSON: I think that I did not speak directly, Representative Vellenga.
I knew that County Attorney Rathke was going to, in terms of the difficulties
that these changes have had within the supreme court rule-making process.
There is no doubt that there have been attempts made and they have failed.
Mr. Rathke spoke to the reasons why those attempts have failed [see infra
note 243 and accompanying text]. There is no doubt, however, but that this
legislature can and should act. In other areas, where there has been a need
to act, you have done so. Let me just tick some off: the area of the rape
shield law, the legislature has acted even though that could have been done
through the rule-making authority; in the area of allowing certain out of
court statements by child victims to be introduced, the legislature has acted;
in the area of domestic abuse law, the legislature has acted. It is clear that
when the legislature has sensed a public concern it has acted. We're here to tell you that
there 's-and I'm sure you sense as well-a public concern regarding the balance of the
existing system.
VELLENGA: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Johnson, in response to your remarks, of
course we always do look at rules and decide whether or not we want to take
over statutorily, but I don't believe you've answered-and maybe I didn't
hear Mr. Rathke fully-why the supreme court rejected this and why in this
particular instance. Are you responding to me Tom and saying that the reason we
should take over from the supreme court is that they aren't understanding the public's
position? Is that what you meant by that last remark about public concern?
JOHNSON: I'm saying that I believe you have a more heightened awareness about
that concern, vis-d-vis that other process, first of all; and secondly, what I did try
to do in my remarks was to identify the context in which this should be
considered. And that context is different than it was in 1981 or 1975 when it
was previously considered [by the court]. And that context is different for
two reasons. One, an increased sensitivity for victim's rights, and these proposals do
broaden, do affect victim's rights in a positive way. Secondly, because there is a different
crime climate within our state now than there has been in the past. Not to say that
this is going to have an impact on that crime rate, but that there are more
crime victims coming through the system.
Dialogue between Representative Vellenga and County Attorney Johnson during the
House Judiciary Committee meeting, February 3, 1987 (tape on file at the Legislative
Reference Library) (emphasis added to illustrate the relevant remarks).
243. Remarks of Stephen Rathke, Crow Wing County Attorney, at the HouseJudi-
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The arguments by the prosecutors for bypassing the court's
rulemaking process are without merit. The history of the or-
der of final argument supports this point. Prosecutors repeat-
edly opposed any rule amendment in recent years that would
have allowed them a chance for a rebuttal. These amendments
were opposed because they did not also allow the prosecutors
the tactical advantages of speaking both first and last.24 4 The
proponents of the bill were simply turning to the legislature
out of frustration because they were not successful with the
court. 245 The legislature, in effect, served as an alternative
ciary Committee meeting on February 3, 1987 (tape on file at the Legislative Refer-
ence Library).
Ronald Meshbesher, a member of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal
Procedure, responded:
I wish we had five defense votes on that committee as Mr. Rathke indicated.
The make-up of that committee was rather-quote, unquote-conservative
from the viewpoint of the criminal defense lawyer. We had Judge Odden
from Duluth, who was a former prosecutor; Judge Chester Rosengren, who
was a former prosecutor; Judge Bruce Stone, who was a former prosecutor;
Charles Johnson, who is now a judge and was a prosecutor at the time he
was appointed to the committee. And John McGibbon, who is the County
Attorney in Sherbourne County, and has been for many years, was on that
committee. And George Scott, of the supreme court, was a former prosecu-
tor, and an advisory member of that committee. The only real, true defense
lawyers, who did a considerable amount of work, were Paul Jones and my-
self. Henry Fikman handles an occasional criminal case and David Graven
handled perhaps three in this whole career as a lawyer. And Henry McCarr
was on the committee, he is a judge now and a former prosecutor. Anyone
who would label that committee as a defense oriented committee has had his
head in the sand. In fact, I caught hell from most of the members of the
criminal defense bar, when the rules came out because they said I was a
traitor. How could I be a party to those rules?
Remarks of Mr. Ronald Meshbesher during the HouseJudiciary Committee meeting,
February 3, 1987 (tape on file at the Legislative Reference Library).
244. See supra notes 224-30 and accompanying text. Philip Bush also explained
this point: "The prosecutors publicly stated 'need' for rebuttal to respond to 'spuri-
ous' defense arguments was contradicted by their opposition to getting such a chance
for rebuttal. It showed that prosecutors really wanted to have the advantage of being
able to argue both first and last." Bush, supra note 215, at 26, n.6.
245. County Attorney Stephen Rathke seemed to concede this point later when
Justice Lawrence Yetka questioned him at a supreme court hearing that was held to
consider the legislative changes:
J. YETKA: It is my understanding these changes came about because of
the direct action on behalf of the County Attorneys Association. My ques-
tion is, why you didn't do your work through the committee and where
you're represented?
RATHKE: I guess the straightforward answer is we didn't think it would
succeed. So we didn't feel that was the place to go. Please keep in mind that
what we did, is simply ask the legislature to amend a statute. We did not ask
the legislature to create a statute where none exists that supercedes an ex-
isting rule. We asked the legislature to amend two statutes which have,
frankly, bedeviled prosecutors for years and years. There was a Crime Coin-
mission Report in 1925 that suggested this change. That's what we did.
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means of acquiring rule amendments that were advantageous
to prosecutors. 246
Many of the legislators believed that they had legitimately
reserved a right in the enabling act to enact or modify statutes
that would supercede the court's rules. 247 As a result, the ad-
vice of Justice Scott-that the legislators not get involved with
court procedure because it was a violation of the separation of
powers-was apparenlty accepted by only two of the six legis-
lators on the senate subcommittee at which he testified.2 48
There were a number of fallacious arguments presented to
the legislators as testimony on the bill. For example, promot-
ers of the legislation presented the rule change to the legisla-
tors as a "victim's rights" piece of legislation.249 According to
Also, I don't want to dwell on this, because it's not that important, this was
not the County Attorney Association's proposal. However, once it was in-
troduced, we adopted it. So it isn't that we caused this bill to be introduced.
Once it was introduced, we, the Association, lobbied for it and supported it.
Remarks of Crow Wing County Attorney Stephen Rathke during the supreme court
hearing to discuss proposed changes to the rules of criminal procedure, June 25,
1987 (tape on file at the Minnesota Supreme Court).
246. For an example of another such change see supra note 176.
247. Senator Alan Spear, Senate author of the bill, commented:
I think we can proceed and I think we're competent to make a decision on
this. I don't think it was the legislature's intention, back in the early seven-
ties-seventy-three, seventy-four, whenever it was, that we gave the courts
the right to formulate the rules of evidence and the rules of criminal proce-
dure-that it was ever the intention of the legislature that we would not
have, ever have, the opportunity to legislate in this area again. I think the
intent was to clearly reserve for ourselves the right, when we saw fit, to legis-
late in this area. So, with all due respect to Justice Scott and Dean Pirsig,
and they are both men for whom I have great respect, I think that we ought
to continue and vote on this bill.
Remarks of Senator Alan Spear during the Senate Criminal Law Division meeting,
April 21, 1987 (tape on file at the Legislative Reference Library).
248. The testimony ofJustice Scott and Professor Pirsig prompted two co-authors
of the bill-Senator Ramstad and Senator Marty-to withdraw their support and vote
in opposition to passage. Telephone interview with Senator Jim Ramstad (IR-
Dist.45), Sept. 9, 1987.
The vote in the Senate division on a motion by Senator Pogemiller to send the
bill to the full committee without a recommendation was four in favor and two op-
posed. (An earlier motion by Senate Spear to send the bill to the full committee
"with approval" had failed.) Senator Ramstad commented later, "There was not
enough support in the division for approval of the bill, but Spear [Senate sponsor or
the bill] being the chairman and Tom Johnson [Hennepin County Attorney] being
the force behind this, it was brought before the full committee." Id.
249. Consider, for example, the following remarks of a witness before the House
Judiciary Committee:
Having worked closely with Randy [Representative Kelly, House sponsor of
the bill] for some four years, working with him to really elevate Minnesota
from ajust-so-state in terms of victim's rights to one of the leading states in
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many of the witnesses testifying before the legislature on be-
half of the bill, a prosecutorial rebuttal was necessary in order
for prosecutors to redeem the integrity of crime victims who
are attacked by defense attorneys in their closing argu-
ments. 250 As one editorial explained, however, court proce-
dure should not presume "that the accused is the victimizer
and the accusing party the victim." 2 5 1 The proposal before the
legislature was certainly not a victim's rights bill, but the myth
was appealing and may have influenced some legislators.2 2
the nation in terms of victim's rights; and I can tell you that his interest in
these changes have nothing to do with any affinity that he has for prosecu-
tors-that has nothing to do with it-and I think this is being painted as a
prosecutor's bill. This is a victim's bill and I think that you should all re-
member that.
Testimony of Dr. William Kosiak, representing the Minnesota Association for Crime
Victims, before the House Judiciary Committee, Feb. 10, 1987 (tape on file at the
Legislative Reference Library).
As one witness, however, against the bill explained, "Don't let anybody kid
you.... This is not a victim's rights bill. It's guised in that because that's the kind of
legislation that looks good for the public. These are serious questions. I don't think
they're frivolous issues, but they ought not to be addressed from the wrong perspec-
tive." Testimony of Ronald Meshbesher, private attorney, before the House Judici-
ary Committee, Feb. 3, 1987 (tape on file at the Legislative Reference Library). See
also infra note 252.
250. One representative of crime victims explained the case for allowing prosecu-
tors a rebuttal as follows:
A victim who has heard things about their conduct or about their lifestyle or
about their personality and said in front of a jury can have dreams and
nightmares about that for a long time and can face the prospect of overcom-
ing that on top of the initial trauma caused by the episode for which the trial
is being held.
Statement of Fern Sepler-King, Executive Director of the Crime Victim and Witness
Advisory Council and the Crime Victim Reparations Board, before the House Judici-
ary Committee, Feb. 3, 1987 (tape on file at the Legislative Reference Library).
251. Editorial, supra note 235, at 10A, col.l. As explained in the St. Paul Pioneer
Press and Dispatch, "Representatives of victims' interests contend that prosecutors
should get in the last word so they can counter lies directed at witnesses against the
defendants. Victims deserve sympathy, but court procedures must not presume that
the accused is the victimizer and the accusing party the victim." Id.
252. Consider one Representative's comments: "We keep focusing on that one or
two percent, whatever it may be, of the people that may in fact be innocent and inno-
cently accused. But I guess I'm thinking of the other 97, or 98, or 99 percent of the
folks that have been victims of crime. ... Comment of Representative Marcus
Marsh (IR-Dist. 17A) before the HouseJudiciary Committee, Feb. 16, 1987 (tape on
file at the Legislative Reference Library).
Assistant Hennepin County Public Defender Phil Bush commented:
They tried a new argument. They tried calling this a victim's rights bill,
since that is an issue that is on the agenda in the 1980s. And it's taken the
legitimate concern for victim's rights-the concern to pay attention to vic-
tims-and tried to pass on some legislation the prosecutors have wanted all
along. They're attempting to use victim's rights like a Trojan horse.
They're trying to bring in anything they want and just call it victim's
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A large part of the testimony by the county attorneys was
also emotional and anecdotal: 253 the legislators were told of
closing arguments in which defense attorneys made egregious
comments and the prosecutors had no opportunity for rebut-
tal.254 Inappropriate comments in closing argument, however,
are not made only by defense attorneys, prosecutors can also
be guilty of such tactics.255 Regardless of which side is respon-
sible, there are court procedures to deal with such remarks.
The anecdotes of the legislative witnesses were simply another
attempt to appeal to emotion rather than reason.256 Interest-
rights.... Is it really a victim's rights bill, or is that what they're using to try
to sell it? And given how many arguments they've put forward, and how
those arguments have collapsed, I feel they're just using that as a way of
trying to sell the bill.
Remarks of Assistant Hennepin County Public Defender Phil Bush before the House
Judiciary Committee, Feb. 16, 1987 (copy of tape on file at the Legislative Reference
Library).
253. The fact that a large part of the testimony was emotional and anecdotal was
even commented on at the legislative hearings. See, e.g., Comments of Representative
Kathleen Vellenga, before the House Judiciary Committee, Feb. 16, 1987 (tape on
file at the Legislative Reference Library).
254. This is one of the many anecdotes repeated to the legislators by promoters of
the bill:
For instance, a woman was in a bar. She drank. Her friends left, believing
that she had a ride home with someone else in their group. That person
also left, believing that she had a ride home with the other part of the group.
A man offered her a ride. She accepted that ride. He started out heading in
the direction of her home, and then kept going and headed into a quiet
residential area. In that area, he stopped, he raped her-he raped her vio-
lently. He grabbed the top of her dress, according to her, and ripped it
from her body. The dress was put into evidence. The argument by the de-
fense was "Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, can you not see your husband
or yourself, in a position where a woman who has accepted a ride from you,
and consented to sexual relations, when we both knew what was going to
happen, but then later panic, and cry rape?" That is the kind of case where
a victim sitting in that courtroom, or the people of the state of Minnesota,
should have the opportunity to have a prosecutor and get up and say "La-
dies and gentlemen, look at the dress."
Statements of Karel Moersfelder, Hennepin County Attorney's Office, before the
House Judiciary Committee, Feb. 3, 1987 (tape on file at the Legislative Reference
Library).
255. For example, in State v. Williams, 297 Minn. 76, 210 N.W.2d 21 (1973), the
prosecutor's closing argument included comments implying that the defense coun-
sel's role and function are less of an essential component of the administration of
criminal justice than the role and function of the prosecutor. The prosecutor also
commented that the grand jury's indictment was more than a mere accusation, and
he accused the defendant's wife of lying to the jury. All of these comments were
found by the appellate court to be prejudicial to the defendant and a new trial was
granted. Id. at 85-86, 210 N.W.2d at 26-27.
256. Some of the anecdotes were also misleading-or at least did not support the
proposition of the person giving testimony. This anecdotal approach was used to
persuade the legislators on each of the procedural proposals before the legislative
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ingly, this tactic was not repeated when the promoters of the
bill later appeared before the Minnesota Supreme Court.257
One of the most noticeable characteristics of the committee
testimony was the need to "educate" the legislators on judicial
procedure. 258 This inexperience and lack of knowledge in
matters of court procedure is perhaps the most persuasive ar-
gument in favor of leaving procedural rules to the judiciary.
Court procedure is a difficult and esoteric area of law and cer-
tainly those most familiar with the intricacies are lawyers and
committees. For example, to support the county attorney's proposal to create a pre-
sumption in favor ofjoinder of multiple defendants, Attorney Moersfelder explained:
A case has recently occurred where there were six male defendants. They
were charged with burglary, rape and robbery. There were four trials. By
the time of the third trial-no joinder of defendants-the husband of the
raped woman, who was also a victim of himself [sic], got on the stand and
told a case that was completely deadpan .... A victim cannot sustain the
true depth of his or her feelings through multiple trials. To force them to
do so, repeatedly, over, and over, and over again, does an injustice to the
victim's rights.
Statements of Ms. Karel Moersfelder, Hennepin County Attorney's Office, before the
House Judiciary Committee, Feb. 3, 1987 (tape on file at the Legislative Reference
Library). When asked by Representative David Bishop (IR-Dist.33B) whetherjoinder
had been requested in the case above, the county attorney admitted, "[I]n that partic-
ular case I believe there was not." Id. If the court was not even asked to conduct a
joint trial, what was the point of using this emotional anecdote to persuade the legis-
lators thatjoinder is granted too infrequently by judges? Such comments are clearly
misleading and not entirely truthful to the legislators.
257. Assistant Hennepin County Public Defender Philip Bush expressed similar
sentiments at the supreme court's hearing:
I think one of the policy questions that is very important, that people have
touched on, but I would like to amplify a little bit, is the inherent danger of
having two groups make the decision about what should the content of the
rules be. Because what's happened is, the proponents of these changes said
one thing in the House, they said another thing in the Senate, and they've
said a third thing here; and its been very selective, in a number of ways,
about what they've told different groups.
Comments of Mr. Philip Bush at the Minnesota Supreme Court hearing to review
proposed changes to the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, June 25, 1987
(tape on file at the Minnesota Supreme Court).
258. Stephen Cooper commented at a later supreme court hearing on changes to
the criminal rules:
We don't have-and this is what is of most concern to me-we don't have
experts making the decision. In the legislature, how many fallacious argu-
ments were made-I suggest by the other side and the other side, I'm sure,
suggests by us-but in either case, how many arguments were made that
didn't really address the meats of the issue here. And you had people, who
had never been in a courtroom in their life, sitting there and deciding the
intricacies of procedures .... What there was an attempt to do, was use
emotional arguments off and off point.
Comments of Mr. Stephen Cooper, at the Minnesota Supreme Court's hearing to
review proposed changes to the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, June 25,
1987 (tape on file at the Minnesota Supreme Court).
1989]
71
Pirsig and Tietjen: Court Procedure and the Separation of Powers in Minnesota
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
judges. Unfortunately (though some would argue fortunately),
the number of attorneys serving in the Minnesota Legislature
has been on a steady decline since the early seventies. 259 To-
day, fewer than fifteen percent of the state legislators are law-
yers and fewer than half of the members of the judiciary
committees-where procedural issues are first considered-are
members of the bar.260 Even those legislators who are lawyers
may not always be the most qualified to judge rules of court
procedure. 26'
One lawyer-legislator-a co-author of the bill-acknowl-
edged during the hearings that he did not have an adequate
understanding of criminal procedure and withdrew his support
for the bill.2 62 The unfamiliarity of some legislators with judi-
259. According to a recent article, "[T]he number of lawyer-legislators has de-
clined since the early 1970s .... [Fifteen years ago], attorneys commanded around
25 percent of all the seats in the Legislature. Today they number closer to 11 per-
cent. While some have failed in their bids for reelection, many have simply declined
to run again." O'Donnell, The Lawyer as Legislator, BENCH AND BAR OF MINNESOTA,
March 1986, p. 1 4 .
260. Seven of the seventeen members of the Senate Judiciary Committee are at-
torneys; only one member of the committee's Criminal Law Division (the subcommit-
tee that considered the bill) is an attorney. Only nine of the twenty-eight members of
the House Judiciary Committee are attorneys. See OFFICIAL DIRECTORY OF THE MIN-
NESOTA LEGISLATURE: SEVENTY-FIFTH SESSION 1987-88. The members of the Minne-
sota Supreme Court, on the other hand, are obviously all learned in the law; and the
advisory committees formed by the court to assist them on matters of procedure are
also composed of lawyers, judges and law professors--experts in their field. Court
procedure does not only occasionally come to their attention, it is a matter of almost
daily concern.
261. John Wigmore once explained, "The legislature has an inferior grade of
knowledge. Its most qualified group is the judiciary committee; but the members of
this committee, though lawyers, are not selected for their special knowledge of pro-
cedure. That committee in no sense represents the best knowledge of the bar on
procedure." Wigmore, supra note 214, at 278.
John Hart Ely noted the following in a recent book on the role of the U.S.
Supreme Court: "[W]hat procedures are needed fairly to make what decisions are the
sorts of questions lawyers and judges are good at. (Observe a lawyer on a committee
with non-lawyers and see what role he or she ends up playing.)" J.H. ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw 21 (1980).
262. When the bill to change the order of final argument came before a Senate
subcommittee, Senator Jim Ramstad, the only lawyer-legislator on the committee,
advised his colleagues:
The rules of criminal procedure are an esoteric area and I think properly
within the domain of the supreme court. And that's the threshold issue,
that's the issue I think we have to decide here tonight and, Ijust don't think,
well, in the time remaining, I just don't think that we can do these very
significant changes-in those rules of criminal procedure-justice. You
know, for five years I was in a courtroom everyday, I've been away from it
now since 1978, albeit in another jurisdiction, and I don't feel competent to
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cial procedure was also clear from their comments and ques-
tions during the hearings. Compounding this problem is the
fact that criminal procedure is one of the more controversial
areas of rulemaking. People have common misperceptions and
prejudices about defendants and the criminal justice system.
26 3
It is also essential that any changes to court procedures re-
ceive adequate attention and thoughtful contemplation by the
rule-makers. The legislative process, however, is hurried and
the sessions never seem to be long enough to complete the
business at hand. 264 The legislators are also rushed and under
pressure to complete those items they have time to consider.
make these changes involving joinder, preemptory challenges, order of final
argument.
Remarks of Senator Jim Ramstad (IR-Dist 45) before the Senate Criminal Law Divi-
sion, April 21, 1987 (tape on file at the Legislative Reference Library).
263. The following comment from a legislator serves as an example of prejudice
and unfamiliarity with judicial procedure:
First of all I think, Representative Kelly [House sponsor of the bill], this is
such a good bill we should vote on it today and move it out. But I think first
of all, the committee members, if you look at the book that we got last com-
mittee hearing, a couple committee hearings ago, from a group that does
the statistics in Minnesota, and I guess the reason for this comment is to
rebut a little bit what Mr. Meshbesher [a witness opposed to the bill] said,
because if you look in the back of the book for the latest statistics, for exam-
ple, it says homicide cases: prosecuted, 94; convicted, 75; ten did no time
whatsoever; six did one year or less; only 59 out of that original 94 prose-
cuted did more than one year injail. Look at the case of sexual assaults: 238
prosecuted; only 180 convicted; 29 did no time whatsoever; 77 did one year
or less; and only 74 out of that 180 did more than one year in prison. And it
goes on and on. One area that most of the committee members know that I
have an interest in is the drug area: 1130 prosecuted; only 762 convicted;
295 out of that 762 convicted did no time whatsoever; 434 did less than one
year. Only 33 out of that 762 did more than one year in prison. So I submit
to this committee that, in fact, there needs to be a change, simply because
it's weighed unfairly in favor of the defendant.
Statements of Representative Marcus Marsh (IR-Dist. 17A) before the House Judici-
ary Committee, Feb. 3, 1987 (tape on file at the Legislative Reference Library). Ron-
ald Meshbesher, the witness to whom Representative Marsh's statements were
directed, responded appropriately, "I appreciate those statistics, but you're compar-
ing apples and oranges." Id.
If the Representative's point was that justice is not administered with enough
swiftness, certainty or equality, it could be accepted as logically related. He seems
more upset, however, that some people are acquitted of the crime with which they are
charged and that convicted felons don't spend enough time in prison. Where is the
connection between the order of final argument, joinder of defendants, preemptory
challenges and the amount of time convicted felons serve in prison? Any connection
at all must be remote.
264. By constitutional provision, the legislature is required to be in session for not
more then 120 legislative days each biennium (there is a temporary adjournment
during the session of the first year and the second year of the biennium). MINN.
CONST. art. IV, § 12.
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The 1987 session was not an exception. When the bill to
change the order of final argument was scheduled for consid-
eration in the Senate Judiciary Committee, the time schedule
didn't allow the issue to be taken up until 12:30 a.m. This was
on the last day the committee was to hear testimony and after
many hours of testimony on other bills. A final vote wasn't
taken until nearly 2:00 a.m. and the bill was passed on a vote of
nine to eight. 265 Procedural issues simply deserve more time
and study than the legislature can generally allow.
266
Despite the institutional drawbacks of legislatively created
court procedures, the bill was eventually approved by both
houses of the legislature.2 67 Following the passage of the bill
and its signature into law by the governor, the rules of criminal
procedure were in a precarious condition: a statute was in di-
rect contradiction to a supreme court promulgated rule. The
legislature's statute granted the prosecutors a limited right to a
rebuttal in final arguments, the court promulgated rule did
not.
2 6 8
265. See Senate Judiciary Minutes, p. 5, April 28, 1987 (regarding the statute to
change the order of final argument in a criminal trial). A vote was taken on the bill
despite the protests from some legislators that the issue deserved more time for
thought. It should be noted, however, that the House Judiciary Committee devoted
approximately seven hours of time to testimony on the bill.
266. The judiciary's method of rulemaking, on the other hand, can allow ample
time for the debate and contemplation of procedural rules. The court, and especially
its advisory committees, are not as restricted as the legislature in the amount of time
they can devote to rulemaking. The quantity and quality of the rules produced by the
.court is alone an indication of the time and thought devoted to rulemaking. The
court and advisory committees are also free to meet whenever the need arises. See
also supra text accompanying note 63.
267. The passage of the bill was not as simply stated. Bush explained: "A close
vote on the House floor resulted in the closing argument provision being deleted
from the bill but a few weeks later, after vigorous efforts by the prosecution and
police lobbies, the provision was reinstated and the bill was sent to the Senate."
Bush, supra note 215, at 24-25. After substantial amendments in the Senate commit-
tees, the full Senate passed the bill and the House approved the Senate version. Id.
268. MINN. STAT. § 631.07, as amended by the legislature in 1987, now reads:
When the giving of evidence is concluded in a criminal trial, unless the case
is submitted on both sides without argument, the prosecution may make a
closing argument to the jury. The defense may then make its closing argu-
ment to the jury. On the motion of the prosecution, the court may permit the prosecu-
tion to reply in rebuttal if the court determines that the defense has made in its closing
argument a misstatement of law or fact or a statement that is inflammatory or preudi-
cial. The rebuttal must be limited to a direct response to the misstatement of law or fact
or the inflammatory or preudicial statement.
MINN. STAT. § 631.07 (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
The provision of the bill regarding preemptory challenges was deleted in the
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C. Court Capitulation
If the issue had come up in a case of which final argument
rule should prevail the supreme court might have been con-
fronted with the constitutionality of legislative rulemaking.
Within a month, however, after passage of the county attor-
ney's bill, the supreme court held an open hearing to consider
amendments to the rules of criminal procedure. This hearing
had been scheduled well in advance for other purposes, but
the court arranged to also consider the issue of the legisla-
ture's statutory amendments.
At the hearing, it was clear that at least some of the justices
were unhappy with the manner in which the county attorneys
received their rebuttal. Justice Yetka commented to one of the
proponents of the change:
You had a chance to make all of these arguments before
[the advisory committee] over and over again. We've gone
to the legislature as a judiciary and as a bar association, tell-
ing the legislature that we're better qualified in the profes-
sion to set the rules....
[I]f there's something you don't like about the rule, you
go into the legislature and get it changed. Now, is that go-
ing to persist? If so, what is that going to do to the process
that we've been using now in this state for the last thirty-five
years? You're riding a law and order crest, supposing that
shifts later on and if the defense doesn't like some of the
proposed changes on the part of the committee they're go-
ing to go to the legislature too. What's the purpose in hav-
ing a committee of this kind, in which you're all represented
to work out your differences, if it's going to be ignored?2 69
Despite the concerns expressed by the justices, following the
hearing the supreme court modified its rule to coincide with
the legislative statute.270
The objectives of the court in adopting the rule that corre-
sponds to the statute are not apparent. The court gave no rea-
sons for its action. It also did not follow its usual procedure of
first submitting the question to its Committee on Rules of
Senate committee, but the provision regarding joinder was approved with certain
amendments. The latter also conflicted with the court's promulgated rule.
269. Comments ofJustice Lawrence Yetka at the Minnesota Supreme Court hear-
ing to review proposed changes to the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, June
25, 1987 (tape on file at the Minnesota Supreme Court).
270. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03 sub. 11 (1988).
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Criminal Procedure.27' The court may have felt that the rule
on the order of final argument was not one on which to insist
on its inherent power over court procedures. On the other
hand, by adopting the new rule, the court may have been indi-
cating to the legislature that, although the new rule conformed
to the statute, the court was in fact asserting its inherent and
exclusive power over court procedures. But regardless of
whatever intentions the court may have had for its actions, the
confusion over the rulemaking power remains. As evidenced
by the statement of Senator Spear,2 72 the legislature, in enact-
ing the statute, assumed that it, rather than the court, has the
ultimate control over and responsibility for court procedures.
CONCLUSION
It is rcasonable to anticipate that the issue of a conflicting
statute and rule will soon emerge again. Those who dislike a
court rule and observe what took place on the order of final
argument may seek like nullification by appealing to the legis-
lature. In that event, it is also reasonable to anticipate that the
court will reassert its inherent constitutional authority and re-
sponsibility on matters of court procedure and will not aban-
don the position it and appellate courts of other states have
uniformly adopted. Our examination of the power over court
procedure, including its history, its constitutional status and its
practical and realistic aspects, persuades us that this is the po-
sition that leads to the most desirable court procedures and
best serves the public interest in the fair and efficient adminis-
tration of justice.
271. The court had rejected an early recommendation of the committee, see supra
note 230, which appears to have been the product of compromise within the commit-
tee and would probably have been unworkable in practice.
272. See supra note 247.
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